WRT333

Definitions and Descriptions

Syllabus | Table of Pages

Definitions: Definitions help us to understand what something means by telling us about what it is and what it is not.

An Example

Scientific writing serves as a wellspring of new and constantly evolving language, which is discernable when we compare modern writing with samples from the past, as Gross et al. (2002) did in Communicating Science: The Scientific Article from the 17th Century to the Present (more). Evolution comes at the cost, as we have discussed previously, of a great trade-off between reading efficiency within discourse communities and opacity beyond the bounds of the community. Both within and outside of discourse communities, there is a major need for working definitions, the mechanism that allows us to refine, expand, focus, or to make accessible our words to the narrowest or the broadest of audiences. The ability to define our terms and to describe objects and processes is critical to making complex language understandable.

An author who intends to welcome a wide audience to explore a difficult intellectual landscape needs to orient readers,preparing them to navigate and comprehend; else, readers will balk at entering the strange forest, and the intent of hosting diverse visitors will be frustrated. For example, in the introduction to his grand sociological theory, The Constitution of Society (1984), Giddens welcomes readers by building a clear and friendly conceptual foundation, exploring both esoteric phrases from within the sociology discourse community as well as words that have an ordinary sound and a day-to-day normal meaning; slowly, he narrows and specifies the special senses that he intends as the exploration begins. The following passage is a bit long, but serves well to illustrate how a brilliant and caring author defines the territory of this work, while preparing the traveler with more than the rudiments needed for the trip. Giddens has introduced three issues of contemporary social theory in the section leading up to this passage, and we begin from there:

It is with these three core sets of issues, and their mutual connections, that the theory of structuation, as I represent it in this book, is concerned. 'Structuration' is an unlovely term at best, although it is less inelegant in the Gallic context from which it came. I have not been able to think of a more engaging word for the views I want to convey. In elaborating the concepts of structuration theory, I do not intend to put forward a potentially new orthodoxy to replace the old one. But structuration theory is sensitive to the shortcomings of the orthodox consensus and to the significance of the convergent developments noted above.

In case there is any doubt about terminology here, let me emphasize that I use the term 'social theory' to encompass issues that I hold to be the concern of all the social sciences. These issues are to do with the nature of human action and the acting self; with how interaction should be conceptualized and its relation to institutions; and with grasping the practical connotations of social analysis. I understand 'sociology', by contrast, to be not a generic discipline to do with the study of human societies as a whole, but that branch of social science which focuses particularly upon the 'advanced' or modern societies. Such a disciplinary characterization implies an intellectual division of labour, nothing more. While there are theorems and concepts which belong distinctively to the industrialized world, there is no way in which something called 'sociological theory', in other words, can if one likes be regarded as a branch of social theory more generally, but it cannot sustain a whole separate identity. This book is written with a definite sociological bias, in the sense that I tend to concentrate upon material particularly relevant to modern societies. But as an introduction to structuration theory it is also intended in substantial degree as a formulation of the tasks of social theory in general and is 'theory' in the same sense. That is to say, the focus is upon the understanding of human agency and of social institutions.

'Social theory' is not a term which has any precision, but it is a very useful one for all that. As I represent it, 'social theory' involves the analysis of issues which spill over into philosophy, but it is not primarily a philosophical endeavour. The social sciences are lost if they are not directly related to philosophical problems by those who practise them. To demand that social scientists be alive to philosophical issues is not the same as driving social science into the arms of those who might claim that it is inherently speculative rather than empirical. Social theory has the task of providing conceptions of the nature of human social activity and of the human agent which can be placed in the service of empirical work. The main concern of social theory is the same as that of the social sciences in general: the illumination of concrete processes of social life. To hold that philosophical debates can contribute to this concern is not to suppose that such debates need to be resolved conclusively before worthwhile social research can be initiated. On the contrary, the prosecution of social research can in principle cast light on philosophical controversies just as much as the reverse. In particular, I think it wrong to slant social theory too unequivocally towards abstract and highly generalized questions of epistemology, as if any significant developments in social science had to await a clear-cut solution to these.

A few remarks are necessary about the 'theory' in social theory. There are certain senses often attributed to 'theory' in the social sciences from which I want to maintain some considerable distance. One conception used to be popular among some of those associated with the orthodox consensus, although it is no longer widely held today. This is the view—influenced by certain versions of the logical empiricist philosophy of natural science—that the only form of 'theory' worthy of the name is that expressible as a set of deductively related laws or generalizations. This sort of notion has turned out to be of quite limited application even within the natural sciences. If it can be sustained at all, it is only in respect to certain areas of natural science. Anyone who would seek to apply it to social science must recognize that (as yet) there is no theory at all; its construction is an aspiration deferred to a remote future, a goal to be striven for rather than an actual part of the current pursuits of the social sciences."

Gidden's introduction continues, gradually building and further refining upon the foundation laid here. That foundation has succeeded in defining both words of 'social theory', limiting Gidden's meaning of social (...modern...practical) while differentiating theory by contrasting it with broad concepts from the natural sciences (dependent on deductive reasoning...generalizations). Even a novice reader, unfamiliar with the origins of social theory or the nuances of contemporary branches and inter-twinings within the discourse community can emerge from such introductory definitions with a clearer sense of who Giddens is, the bounds of the concerns to be covered in his book, and with a subtle awareness that while the author is clearly articulate and the present work scholarly, Giddens just might be trusted to be a dedicated and thoughtful guide in what follows.

Defining Definition

The problem of definition is old; Aristotle wrestled with it in his Metaphysics. The central concern is to understand a word by both associating it with a larger context while also separating it from that context by noting particular distinctions. For a biologist, this is the familiar task of taxonomy, grouping organisms on the basis of morphological (or phenotypic or genotypic) similarities, and then separating the group into subgroups on the basis of distinguishing markers. The analogy between phylogenetic genera and species is the basis for ancient characterization of the problem of definition as one of genus-differentia. That is, the genus is a broad category that can be divided into species on the basis of differentia. For example, if I say happiness is an emotion caused by feelings of good fortune and love, I am defining happiness in the context of the genus emotion and differentia of two kinds of positive feelings (others might define it with alternate feelings). This is essentially the pattern followed by Giddens in the example above.

A similar approach of defining by grouping and recognizing differences within the group is explained in the following, from Wikipedia (see):

An intensional definition, also called a connotative definition, specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of a specific set. Any definition that attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, is an intensional definition.

An extensional definition, also called a denotative definition, of a concept or term specifies its extension. It is a list naming every object that is a member of a specific set.

So, for example, an intensional definition of 'Prime Minister' might be the most senior minister of a cabinet in the executive branch of government in a parliamentary system. An extensional definition would be a list of all past, present and future prime ministers.

More: Here are some additional rules, also from Wikipedia:

"Certain rules have traditionally been given for this particular type of definition:

  1. A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined.
  2. Definitions should avoid circularity. To define a horse as 'a member of the species equus' would convey no information whatsoever. For this reason, Locke adds that a definition of a term must not consist of terms which are synonymous with it. This error is known as circulus in definiendo (popularly, "circular reasoning"). Note, however, that it is acceptable to define two relative terms in respect of each other. Clearly, we cannot define 'antecedent' without using the term 'consequent', nor conversely.
  3. The definition must not be too wide or too narrow. It must be applicable to everything to which the defined term applies (i.e. not miss anything out), and to no other objects (i.e. not include any things to which the defined term would not truly apply).
  4. The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are commonly understood and whose meaning is clear. The violation of this rule is known by the Latin term obscurum per obscurius. However, sometimes scientific and philosophical terms are difficult to define without obscurity. (See the definition of Free will in Wikipedia, for instance).
  5. A definition should not be negative where it can be positive. We should not define 'wisdom' as the absence of folly, or a healthy thing as whatever is not sick. Sometimes this is unavoidable, however. We cannot define a point except as 'something with no parts', nor blindness except as 'the absence ofsight in a creature that is normally sighted'."

Applications and Advice

Here are some additional considerations and suggestions for writing various types of definitions, from Markel (2002):

KINDS OF DEFINITIONS include short or long, informal or formal, in three types:

Examples: Notice how this student defines terms with ease and smoothness in this section of a paper, using parenthetical and sentence definitions, examples, and compare and contrast with skill and effectiveness:

"Carbon dioxide plays a major role in temperature regulation on Earth. It is a greenhouse gas, a gas that reflects heat and traps it in the atmosphere (EPA, 2011). Normally, the natural processes of the planet, including photosynthesis and ocean circulation, should balance the amount of CO2 in the stmosphere. While CO2 is a naturally occurring gas (it is produced by plants, volcanoes, etc.), its production as a byproduct of human activities is a concern."Ice-coring, a process in which vertical ice samples are collected and analyzed for cas concentrations, has allowed scientists to determin that the climate has shifted from warm to cold and back again numerous times over the course of Earth's history. Any factor that can shift the energy balance that causes these changes on earth, including CO2, is called a forcing agent. Natural forcing agents include volcanic eruptions and the sun, to name two. Largely human-made forcing agents include carbon aerosols, ozone, and other greenhouse gases. While natural climate forcing occurs on a timescale of hundreds of thousands of years, human-induced forcing can occur on the scale of decades. (boldface added to show definitions.)

—Correna Blewett, "Climat change, Politics, and Governance," paper in COM455, Spring 2011 .

PLACING THE DEFINITION (except for parenthetical, which go within the sentence, of course) typically involves six locations

  1. In the text.
  2. In the marginal gloss (in the margin, next to the text).
  3. In a hyperlink (web).
  4. In footnotes (on same page or at the end of the document).
  5. In a glossary (alphabetized list of definitions).
  6. In an appendix.

Role of Descriptions.

Audience and Purpose. Before writing a description, consider the audience, its needs and background (why do they need a description and what should they already know?), and your purpose in writing the description (what do you expect the audience to do with it?)

Suggestions for Writing the Description.

References