Foreign Capital Market: The Balance of Payments and Exchange Rates

It should come as no surprise the scale and scope of international exchange has expanded dramatically in the post WW II era since we are in the midst of an irreversible process called globalization. If you have any doubts consider the differences between a day in your life today and that of your parents or grandparents in early 1960s. You are likely to be driving a Japanese car that runs on oil from the Mid East, wearing a shirt made in Central America, relaxing on your Scandinavian furniture watching a movie on your TV/VCR that was made in South Korea, vacationing in Europe, the Caribbean, or Mexico, working for a foreign-owned company, producing goods and services to be consumed outside of the US. In the early 1960s, meanwhile, you would be far more likely to be working for an American owned company producing goods for domestic consumption, driving American cars produced in the Midwest running on oil from the American Southwest, vacationing in Florida or New Hampshire, and watching American produced TVs while resting in American furniture.

Given that international trade is inevitable, it is essential to have a system to handle the international transactions. The primary tool used by nations to monitor their international financial position is the set of statistical measures of the international income and expenditure flows known as the Balance of Payments Account (BOPA). The BOPA is a simple double-entry accounting system where the two sides of the ledger must balance each other out.  The BOPA account is an income statement rather than a balance sheet where the entries are not assets and liabilities, but rather transactions between residents of different countries. All of the international transactions are classified as either credits ( + capital inflow), that result in the receipt of dollars, or debits ( - capital outflows), that result in the payment of dollars. A simple guide for classifying transactions is provided in the table below.

Transaction Classification Scheme

Negative Effects (debits)
  Any payment to a foreign country
  Any investment in a foreign country
  Any purchase of goods or services abroad
  Any gift or aid to foreign governments
  Any purchase of stocks or bonds in a foreign country
Positive Effects (credits)
  Any receipt from a foreign country
  Any earnings on investment in a foreign country
  Any sale of goods or services abroad
  Any gift or aid from a foreign governments
  Any of stocks or bonds by a foreign investor

The international Balance of Payments is divided into three components, the Current Account (Cu), the Capital Account (Ca) including the official reserve account (Ra), and the Statistical Discrepancy (Sd).  An abridged version of the international transactions for 1970-1997 are presented below. For a complete on-line version you should visit the BEA's site.

US International Transactions

1970

1980

1988

1992

1997

1970-1997 1988-1997
Exports of G&S

65,674

342,485

529,806

730,460

1,179,380

1696%

123%

Merchandise

42,469

224,269

319,251

440,138

679,325

1500%

113%

Services

11,458

45,712

102,780

179,710

258,268

2154%

151%

  Transfer under
   Military

1,501

8,274

10,050

11,015

18,269

1117%

82%

  Travel&transportation

6,000

24,797

56,992

93,987

121,074

1918%

112%

  Misc Services

3,957

12,641

35,738

74,708

118,925

2905%

233%

Income on US Assets

11,747

72,506

107,775

110,612

241,787

1958%

124%

Imports of G&S

-59,901

-333,360

-641,698

-763,966

-1,294,904

2062%

102%

Merchandise

-39,866

-249,749

-446,466

-536,276

-877,279

2101%

96%

Services

-14,521

-41,493

-89,684

-123,299

-170,520

1074%

90%

  Direct Defense
  Expenditures

-4,855

-10,851

-14,656

-13,766

-11,488

137%

-22%

  Travel&transportation

-8,038

-25,794

-59,625

-74,269

-98,404

1124%

65%

  Misc Services

-1,628

-4,848

-15,403

-35,264

-60,628

3624%

294%

Income on foreign Assets

-5,516

-42,120

-105,548

-104,391

-247,105

4380%

134%

  US Military Grants

-2,713

-756

-92

-100%

-100%

Unilateral Transfers

-3,443

-7,593

-14,656

-32,895

-39,691

1053%

171%

US Assets Abroad, net increase

-9,337

-86,118

-82,110

-50,961

-478,502

5025%

483%

US Official Reserve Assets

2,481

-8,156

-3,566

3,901

-1,010

-141%

-72%

US Govt Assets

-1,589

-5,162

2,999

-1,609

174

-111%

-94%

US Private Assets

-10,229

-78,802

-81,543

-53,253

-477,666

4570%

486%

  Direct Investments
  Abroad

-7,590

-19,222

-17,533

-34,791

-121,843

1505%

595%

  Foreign Securities

-1,076

-3,568

-7,846

-47,961

-87,981

8077%

1021%

Foreign Assets in US, net increase

6,359

58,112

219,299

129,579

733,441

11434%

234%

Foreign Official Reserve Assets

6,908

15,497

38,882

40,684

15,817

129%

-59%

Other Foreign Assets

-550

42,615

180,418

88,895

717,624

-130577%

298%

  Direct Investments

1,464

16,918

58,456

2,378

93,449

6283%

60%

  US Securities

81

2,645

20,144

67,167

146,710

181023%

628%

Statistical Discrepancy

-219

25,322

-10,641

-12,218

-99,724

45436%

837%

Balance on
Merchandise Trade

2,603

-25,480

-127,215

-96,138

-197,954

-7705%

56%

Services

-3,063

4,219

13,096

56,411

87,748

-2965%

570%

Goods&Services

-460

-21,261

-114,119

-39,727

-110,206

23858%

-3%

Current Account

2,330

1,532

-126,548

-66,401

-155,215

-6762%

23%

The current account measures the flow of income into and out from a country. In this sense it is similar to an individual's income statement where the credits represent income and debits represent expenses.

The largest and most often publicized component of the current account is the Balance of Merchandise Trade (BOT) which is the difference between the $ value of merchandise exports and imports (X-M).  In 1992, the US ran a trade deficit of $96.138 billion, about half of what it was in 1997 ($197.954 billion). 

What is not evident in the net figures is the substantial growth in exports and imports.  Although imports (2000%) have risen faster than exports (1700%), both have grown consistently faster than GDP (800%). The result has been that their shares of GDP has more than doubled between 1960 and 1997.

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As for the balance, the US ran a balance of trade surplus consistently until 1971. After 1971, the trade deficit continued to grow, with only a brief interruption during the 1980-82 recessions, and by 1987 the balance of trade deficit had peaked at 3.5% of GDP. In large part, the ballooning of the trade deficit can be attributed to the precipitous slowdown in the growth of US exports that accompanied a rather dramatic rise in the value of the dollar. In 1986 the value of exports remained virtually unchanged from their 1980 level, while imports had increased by nearly 50 percent. Since 1986, however, exports have rebounded and the balance of trade deficit for 1997 stood at 2.4% of GDP.

In addition to the growth in the levels of international transactions, there has also been a substantial change in its composition. Between 1965 and 1997, there has been nearly a 60% drop in agricultural products' share of exports that has been partially matched by increases in the exports of capital goods and automobiles. In 1997 agricultural products accounted for 10% of US exports, slightly less than the value of automobile exports (10.4%) and substantially less than the 40% share of capital goods.

On the import side, the two most politically sensitive categories are petroleum and automobiles. Petroleum's share of imports in 1992 was 12%, above where it was in 1965 (8%), but sharply lower than the rate in 1980. As a result of the two rounds of OPEC price increases in the 1970s and a fairly inelastic demand for oil, petroleum accounted for nearly one-third of all imports by 1980 (35%). Once the collapse of oil prices began in the recession of 1980-82, however, petroleum's share of exports began its slide back to 9%.  Automobiles, meanwhile, account for 21% of US imports, down sharply from the 35% range in the mid 1980s.  Finally, capital goods represent 37 percent of imports, up sharply from the 6% share in 1965.

1997 Sectoral Breakdown of Commodity Trade
(millions of $s)

Commodity Exports Imports Net Export
Agricultural

58,425

Nonagricultural

620,900

Food, feeds, beverages

51,507

39,694

11,813

Petroleum

71,771

Nonpetroleum

484,687

Industrial supplies and materials

158,274

217,304

(59,030)

Capital goods

295,288

254,175

41,113

Nonelectrical machinery

223,646

207,674

15,972

Civilian aircraft

41,359

16,598

24,761

Automobiles

74,029

140,778

(66,749)

Consumer goods

77,445

193,042

(115,597)

Total

679,325

877,279

(197,954)

A geographic breakdown of imports and exports is provided in the table below. In 1997, the three largest markets for US exports were Canada, Mexico, and Japan. At a more aggregate level we find that Asia was the largest market for US exports (32% of the total), followed by Europe (22%), and Latin America (20%). The pattern of imports, meanwhile, are more heavily skewed toward Asia.  The big three importers in 1997 were Japan, Mexico, and China.  Asia accounted for a full 40% of US imports with Japan and China accounting for nearly one-half.  Imports from the newly industrialized countries of Asia, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong, were approaching the level of imports from Europe's largest industrial nations. 

1997 Geographic Breakdown of Trade
(millions of $s)

Exports Imports Net
Western Europe

152,962

175,770

(22,808)

France

15,804

20,607

(4,803)

Germany

24,202

43,018

(18,816)

UK

35,912

32,496

3,416

Canada

152,047

171,024

(18,977)

Japan

64,600

121,658

(57,058)

Australia...

11,913

4,881

7,032

Eastern Europe

7,750

8,481

(731)

Latin America

134,272

140,378

(6,106)

Mexico

71,152

86,661

(15,509)

Brazil

15,806

9,625

6,181

Asia

144,777

234,887

(90,110)

OPEC

16,045

21,753

(5,708)

China

12,723

62,555

(49,832)

Hong Kong

15,065

10,285

4,780

Korea

24,602

23,145

1,457

Singapore

17,550

20,077

(2,527)

Taiwan

19,159

32,631

(13,472)

Africa

10,615

19,924

(9,309)

Total

679,325

877,279

(197,954)

A less publicized, but more rapidly growing component of the BOPA, is the balance in services. Included here are tourist expenses, transportation costs, and royalties and licensing fees.  In 1992 the balance on the service account was $56.411 billion and by 1997 it had grown to $87.748 billion. 

Sectoral Breakdown of Service Trade
(millions of $s)

Exports Imports Net
Total

239,215

156,236

82,979

Travel

121,074

97,813

23,261

Royalties& license fees

33,676

9,411

24,265

Education

8,278

1,347

6,931

Financial

11,064

3,906

7,158

Insurance

2,391

5,208

(2,817)

Telecommunications

3,771

8,113

(4,342)

Business, professional, technical

21,304

6,571

14,733

The third component of the current account is the income received from investments abroad.  In 1970 the inflow of income into the US from control of foreign assets was more than twice the outflow, but by 1997 the imbalance had ended and the US was running a $5.5 billion deficit on this account.  During this twenty-seven year period, the income on foreign assets grew twice as fast as imports and four times the rate of service growth.  By 1997 income on foreign owned assets share of GDP was ten times higher than in 1960. 

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The final component of the current account measures unilateral transfers. Included in this item are government transfers and grants and private remittances.  For an industrialized country such as the US, remittances tend to be small and the flow tends to be outward as 'guest workers' send money home.  In 1997 the net outflow totaled $39.691 billion.

The combined balance of these four components is called the Balance on Current Account. In 1997 the Balance on Current Account was $155.215 billion, smaller than the Balance on Merchandise Trade account due to the surplus in services.

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The Capital Account

When examining the second component of the balance of payments, the capital account, it may be helpful to think of the balance on capital account as the mirror image of the balance on current account. Returning to the case of the individual, if an individual is spending more than she is earning, then she must finance this by borrowing or selling off some of her existing assets. Similarly, if the US is running a trade deficit, the value of imports exceeds the value of exports and there is a flow of dollars out of the country. What will be done with these dollars? The holders of these dollars will try to invest the dollars because it makes no sense just to hold dollars because they earn no interest.  With the exception of the dollars circulating as a world currency, eventually these dollars will make it back into the US as foreign investors attempt to buy US assets with their dollars. In this way the current account deficit will be offset by a capital account surplus.

The capital account consists of the net increase in US assets abroad, primarily an outflow of dollars to purchase foreign assets, and the net increase in foreign assets in the US, an inflow of currency to purchase US assets.  Included in both components of the capital account are figures for acquisitions of the government and private sectors.  Included in the government figure are the net additions/subtractions from the reserve account, the central bank's holdings of foreign currency. The central bank of each country holds a portfolio of international currencies and during any period the level of these reserves is likely to change. 

Capital Account: 1997

Capital Outflow
US assets abroad, net increase (-)

478,502

US official reserve (net)

(1,010)

US government assets, other

174

US private assets

477,666

Direct Investment

121,843

Foreign securities

87,981

Capital Inflow
Foreign assets in US, net increase (+)

733,441

Foreign official assets in US (net)

15,817

Other foreign assets in US

717,624

Direct investment

93,449

US treasury securities

146,710

US securities, not treasury

196,845

In 1997, the net increase of US assets abroad was $478.502 billion, almost all of it in private assets.  Direct investment (new factories, land, businesses) was $121.843 billion while the purchase of foreign securities (stocks, bonds, government securities) totaled $87.981 billion - almost evenly split between stocks and bonds. The capital inflow, as measured by the net increase in foreign assets in the US, totaled $733.441 billion.  This included $146.710 billion for US Treasury securities, $93.449 billion in direct investment, and $196.845 billion for other securities - $66 billion in stocks and $131 billion in corporate and other bonds.

As for the ownership of international investments, the value of US direct investment abroad (historical-cost basis) was $777 billion.  The breakdown by continents appears below.  Manufacturing facilities account for slightly more than one-third of the value of foreign assets, while finance, insurance, and real estate accounts for slightly less than one-third.  In Latin America investments tend to be more weighted to finance, insurance, and real estate, while this sector is under represented in Asia.  Europe, meanwhile, is the primary beneficiary of US foreign investment with nearly 50% of the total while the Middle East and Africa each get around 1 percent.

US Direct Investment Position Abroad (1997)

All industries

Petroleum Manufacturing Wholesale Depository institutions

Finance, insurance, real estate

Services Other
All

100.0%

10.0%

33.5%

8.0%

4.0%

32.6%

4.7%

7.1%

Canada

100.0%

12.7%

45.9%

7.3%

1.0%

19.1%

4.7%

9.2%

Europe

100.0%

7.0%

33.9%

8.2%

4.1%

36.5%

5.9%

4.3%

Latin America

100.0%

5.5%

27.5%

4.9%

2.8%

47.2%

3.1%

8.9%

Africa

100.0%

57.8%

18.6%

2.0%

2.9%

7.8%

1.0%

9.8%

Middle East

100.0%

39.3%

19.1%

3.4%

7.9%

21.3%

4.5%

5.6%

Asia

100.0%

14.3%

34.1%

12.8%

7.0%

16.9%

3.8%

10.9%

US Direct Investment Position Abroad (1997)

All industries

Petroleum Manufacturing Wholesale Depository institutions Finance, insurance, real estate Services Other
All

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Canada

11.6%

14.8%

15.9%

10.6%

2.9%

6.8%

11.5%

15.0%

Europe

48.9%

34.2%

49.4%

50.1%

50.9%

54.7%

60.8%

29.6%

Latin America

20.0%

11.1%

16.5%

12.2%

14.4%

29.0%

13.2%

25.0%

Africa

1.2%

6.9%

0.7%

0.3%

0.9%

0.3%

0.2%

1.6%

Middle East

1.0%

4.1%

0.6%

0.4%

2.1%

0.7%

1.0%

0.8%

Asia

16.6%

23.8%

16.9%

26.5%

29.4%

8.6%

13.2%

25.4%

Foreign investments in the US are concentrated in manufacturing (39.2%) and finance, insurance, and real estate (21.4%).  Europeans tend to be more concentrated in manufacturing, while Asian investors tend to be less concentrated in manufacturing and more highly concentrated in depository institutions.   Within the manufacturing sector, Europe accounts for nearly 3 of every 4 dollars while Japan accounts for more than 4 of every 5 dollars invested in depository institutions (banks).

Foreign Direct Investment Position in US (1997)

All industries

Petroleum Manufacturing Wholesale Depository institutions

Finance, insurance, real estate

Services Other

 

All

100.0%

7.0%

39.2%

15.1%

5.4%

21.4%

6.7%

5.1%

Canada

100.0%

5.5%

43.4%

7.2%

3.3%

26.3%

2.8%

11.7%

Europe

100.0%

7.7%

45.9%

11.8%

5.0%

18.3%

5.7%

5.5%

Latin America

100.0%

10.6%

10.6%

13.7%

10.6%

45.4%

4.8%

3.9%

Africa

100.0%

0.0%

12.5%

3.1%

0.0%

8.8%

0.0%

9.4%

Middle East

100.0%

0.0%

7.0%

6087.0%

0.0%

42.0%

0.0%

0.7%

Asia

100.0%

4.3%

28.9%

6.0%

21.1%

21.1%

11.3%

1.8%

Foreign Direct Investment Position in US (1997)

All industries

Petroleum Manufacturing Wholesale Depository institutions

Finance, insurance, real estate

Services Other
All

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Canada

9.4%

7.3%

10.4%

4.5%

5.7%

11.5%

3.9%

21.6%

Europe

62.4%

68.3%

73.1%

48.8%

57.7%

53.5%

53.5%

66.7%

Latin America

5.2%

8.0%

1.4%

4.8%

10.2%

11.1%

3.7%

4.0%

Africa

0.2%

0.0%

0.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.1%

0.0%

0.4%

Middle East

1.0%

0.0%

0.2%

.4%

0.0%

2.0%

0.0%

0.1%

Asia

21.8%

13.2%

16.0%

8.6%

84.1%

21.5%

36.8%

7.5%

Before leaving the discussion of the capital account, let's take one final look at the change in the account in 1998 as the financial crises rolled through the world's financial markets.  In the table below there are some significant changes that seemed to have taken place between 1997 and the second quarter of 1998.  [Note: the 1998II figures are annual estimates based on second quarter figures].   By the second quarter of 1998  US purchases of foreign stocks virtually dried up in 1998, but this was offset by an increase in purchases of foreign bonds.  Foreign investors, meanwhile, have increased their holding of US bonds substantially, a factor in the rising price of US Treasury securities in late 1998. 

Capital Account Transactions

1997 1998II
Foreign securities, net US purchases

87,981

94,000

Stocks, net US purchase

41,258

4,000

Bonds, net US purchases

46,723

90,000

US securities, net foreign purchases

196,845

278,000

Stocks, net foreign purchases

65,966

60,000

Corporate & other bonds

130,879

218,000

Net inflow

108,864

184,000

What's the bottom line?  Well you will notice the deficit on the current account is not exactly equal to the surplus on the capital account which is usually the case.  In 1997 for example, the current account deficit was $155.2 billion while the capital account surplus was $255 billion. The discrepancy is appropriately entitled, statistical discrepancy (Sd). The double entry accounting system imposes the constraint that the payments and receipts columns equal each other, but the well known problems with the data collection on international transactions ensures that the equality will not be realized. The statistical discrepancy is the residual which ensures the balance and in 1997 equaled $99.724 billion.

We have now looked at the books for international transactions and derived a few measures of the volume of transactions.  It is now time to look at the prices of currencies that are used in these transactions - what you will hear people refer to as the exchange rate.  The price of a currency -  the many dollars you need in order to buy a unit of foreign currency - can be obtained from the business section of any good newspaper.  [If you want some on-line help with making the conversions, check out the Currency Converter site]. In the newspapers section you will find a table that provides the exchange rate between a $ and a wide array of foreign currencies including the mark (Germany), the yen (Japan), the peso (Mexico), the Franc (France), and the pound (UK). For example, you will note that three marks will buy one dollar, or that .333 percent of a dollar will buy a mark. In addition to these individual exchange rates, you will also find the trade-weighted exchange rate which is very much like a price index. It is a weighted sum of a number of exchange rates, where the weights are equal to the country's share of international trade with the US. For this reason, a sharp increase in the yen (Japan) price of the dollar will have a substantially larger impact on the exchange rate of the dollar than a similar increase in the Lira (Italy) price of the dollar because US - Japan trade is larger than US - Italy trade.

As for the history of the value of the dollar, we pick up the story of exchange rates in the late 1960s. Following the freeing of exchange rates in the early 1970s, the value of the dollar began to fall sharply so that by 1980 there was widespread concern over its low value. From its high in the late 1960s, the dollar was down 55 percent against the German mark, 37 percent against the Japanese yen, and 28 percent when using the multi-lateral trade weighted value. The concerns did not last long, however, as the exchange rate began to rise rapidly during the early 1980s. By the time it peaked in 1985, the dollar had regained much of the lost ground. It was up 61 percent against the mark, 5 percent against the yen, and 63 percent based on the multilateral value. At this time there were once again concerns being raised about the dollar's value, but this time it was concern that the dollar was over-valued which made US firms uncompetitive in the world market place. This was a good time to be an American traveling in Europe and not a good time for American firms trying to sell their products to European consumers. By October 1985, there was mounting pressure to impose some forms of protectionism to help American industry that had been badly hurt by the appreciation of the dollar.

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In response to concerted international effort, the dollar began its free-fall in 1985. By 1987 the financial pages were full of articles ranging from how to stop the fall to how much further the dollar must fall. In fact, the decline had been so dramatic that the G-7 countries fashioned the Louvre Accord of February 1987 in which they declared the dollar had fallen enough and attempts would be made to stabilize it. As you can see, however, the attempts were not all that successful, at least in the short-run. By 1989 most of the gains had been lost as the exchange rate fell to levels that existed in the late 1970s.

When examining exchange rates, however, care should be taken when using the multilateral trade-weighted exchange rate. As we will see later, the sharp decline in the dollar was not accompanied by the expected improvement in the balance of trade deficit. One explanation centered around the measured exchange rate. The multilateral rate was based on an outdated market basket of trade flows. For example, in the two years ending in early 1987, the FED estimated the dollar to be down 39 percent based on the US's 10 largest trading partners, while the Dallas FED reported a decline of 5 percent using a sample of 131 trading partners. In fact, during the first two years of the dollar's fall when it declined 45 percent against the German mark and Japanese yen, it lost no ground against the Canada, Singapore, and Hong Kong dollars and the Korean won, and rose more than 300 percent against the Brazilian cruzado and the Mexican peso.

Before leaving our discussion of exchange rates we will look at how the Asian Crises of 1997 were reflected in the foreign exchange rates.  Below you will see the exchange rate for Thailand's bhat.  In a relatively short period of time in 1997 the value of the bhat was more than halved.  At the beginning of 1997 it took 25 bhat to buy a US $ and by the beginning of the following year it took 53 bhat. The result was that goods imported from Thailand to the US went down in price while the cost of US goods in Thailand doubled reducing the buying power of Thailand's people. 

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And as you know the crisis was not contained in Thailand and we can see in the following diagrams the impact on the Malaysian and Singapore currencies. If you want to construct some of your own graphs you should check out the time-series web site

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We have now looked at the basic macroeconomic statistics that have been developed to capture the conditions in the four aggregate markets - output, labor, capital, and foreign exchange. It is now time to move to a discussion of the operation of the markets that generate these statistics and examine the interrelationships between the markets and the links between the markets and government policy tools.