Syllabi


 
PHL 230
Instructor: Dr. Bob Zunjic
  

David Hume

Of the Standard of Taste

An Outline


David Hume (1711-76) is one of the greatest philosophers of the Enlightenment. Writing as an independent intellectual he made significant contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion and ethics. He is widely reputed as a brilliant although skeptical critic of every kind of dogmatism and of any pretension to establish objectively valid foundations of human knowledge. Except for the abstract ideas of mathematics and immediate experiential impressions he did not believe that there is anything in our mind that deserved full trust and the honorific title of truth. Consequently, metaphysics and philosophy were, for him, at best a good pastime (see his A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739, and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748).
In view of these assertions it is surprising to find out that Hume, on the other hand, had not dismissed judging of artworks as just a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. Despite his low opinion of metaphysical pursuits he had a very strong appreciation for the arts and possessed himself a pretty subtle aesthetic sense. In his essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757) he advances the claim that evaluating art should not be regarded as arbitrary and entirely relativist.
Hume composed this essay (the last before his death) in order to meet the demand of his publisher who needed about 20 pages to fill in the gap that emerged after two other (possibly too "atheistic") essays were removed from the planned collection. The essay is "derivative" as it heavily depends on some French and British authors of the time but it still represents an original piece, probably the most important work in Aesthetics before Kant. A full text with bibliography is available at: http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r15.html

1. INTRODUCTION - VARIETY OF TASTE

Essay
Although an "opportunistic" product of Hume's literary activity, the essay is a masterpiece of elegance and style. Its polished and subtle manner of exposition proves, however, to be very deceptive. It creates the impression that the argumentation flows smoothly and clearly from the beginning to the end whereas in reality it abounds with reversals and almost all provided explanations raise more questions than they manage to answer. A careful student should be mindful of many snares intentionally or unintentionally laid down throughout the course of Hume's analysis.
Variety of Taste:

In keeping with his empiricist epistemology Hume starts with a factual statement about the existing variety of taste and opinion. He focuses on the former as the latter proves to be less egregious.
The variety of human taste stretches over different individuals (even siblings may have different taste), across different cultures and throughout different historical periods.

Contrarieties:

Scope of Differences
Character of Differences
Narrow Circle Individual
Same Society Generational
Distant Nations Cultural
Remote Ages Historical

Note: Hume was more interested in art criticism (judging art) than in the philosophy of art as an effort to explain the essence of art. He was particularly intrigued by the question whether our judgments on art are subjective and relativist or objective and universalizable. This explains why he talks about taste (the receptive side) rather than about the artwork itself (the creative side). For Hume, taste denotes the capacity to respond with approbation or disapprobation to external stimuli. If the stimulus is an artistic one the ensuing taste should be understood as the "refined ability to perceive quality in any artwork". This ability corresponds, roughly speaking, to what we would call "aesthetic experience" in general (Hume didn't use the word Aesthetics yet). If likes and dislikes are expressed in value judgments we regard them as judgments of taste. Whether there is a standard of taste is an open issue that allows arguing for both sides (the debate parallels somewhat the debate about the relativity of moral norms).

Relativity:

People react to different taste with surprise and mistrust. The label (epithet) "barbarous" (supposedly denoting the low taste or the lack of taste) is culturally conditioned. It does not tell us anything universally valid (except that it is used with the same arrogance by different people for contrary things). It cannot serve as the criterion of taste since it simply reflects our preference for our taste. It is an expression of conceit.

 
Our Taste Their taste
Civilized Barbarous

Reality:

The differences in aesthetic taste are too obvious and great to be denied. Hume contends that they are in fact greater than they appear. The true extent of the differences is covered by linguistic generalities that indicate universal approval or disapproval. But these generalities conceal the differences in particulars.


Verbal Agreement In almost all cultures there is a consensus in evaluating positively certain epithets. For instance:
Positive Elegance propriety simplicity spirit in writing
Negative Fustian affectation coldness fake brilliancy

Note: Almost all Hume's examples in this essay are taken from one single art - literature. We wish he could have provided some non-literary examples as well but this preference for literary arts was the signature of the time.
Discrepancy: The apparent consensus in words expressing aesthetic attitudes stands in stark contrast with a seeming disagreement in words expressing our ordinary or theoretical views about reality. Upon examination, however, we realize that they are in fact reversed. In this regard, the apparent differences in taste and opinion prove to be deeper where they appear lesser and the other way round. Here is how they differ:
Apparent/Real:
Differences
Taste
Opinion
Reality Greater Lesser
Appearance Lesser Greater
Resolution Differences in opinion (belief) could be in many cases resolved by clarifying the language (purely verbal disagreements) and resorting to the facts. In science we can advance different theories (paradigms) to account for the phenomena (for instance the corpuscular or the wave theory of light) but we can disagree only temporarily about the facts. For example, what is the tallest building in the world?
In contrast, disagreements in taste typically become greater once the illusion of verbal agreement from general discourse is replaced by a closer scrutiny of facts. After we check the reference of generally accepted aesthetic terms we realize that our appreciation of these facts is different. All people value beauty and regard ugliness as repulsive but they disagree what objects are beautiful and what are ugly.
  General Discourse Particulars
Art Verbal Agreement Real Disagreement
Science Verbal Disagreement Real Agreement
Beauty is not something rational (size and order) or objective (beauty in itself) but only an effect on the mind.
Similarity: The arts as the object of taste have many more things in common with morals than with the sciences. The arts and morals are both more grounded in sentiments than in reason. The verbal unanimity is not a result of universal reasoning but a sheer effect of the inner logic of language. This is why both art and morality accept universal precepts while hopelessly differing in practical application. The following table details the similarities between art and morality as well as their common opposition to science.
Opposition:
 
Art
Science
Morality
Organ Senses Reason Heart
Outcome Feeling Opinion Feeling
Disagreement Particulars Generals Particulars
Agreement Generals Particulars Generals

In science language creates apparent disagreements while in art it creates apparent agreements.
Note: Hume does not see a big difference between artistic and moral values. What as a pleasurable sentiment translates in approbation in taste closely corresponds to the sentiment of approbation within our heart: "virtue is whatever mental action or quality gives a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation".
Moral Unanimity:


The unanimity in morals is also more apparent than real. The apparent universality of moral principles is commonly ascribed to the workings of human reason. In reality, its source is the inculcated positive validation of certain terms (virtues: justice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity).
However, the content and the application of these terms may be very different; so much so that sometimes they represent a kind of relations that are called contrarieties (for instance, black and white). Thus it is conceivable that the content of the above virtues, if transferred to another culture, could be regarded as injustice, inhumanity, stinginess, imprudence and mendacity.

Example 1:

Homer's general moral precepts are similar to Fenelon's, but the morality of their heroes is different as it could be. For instance, Homer praises the heroism of Achilles and the prudence of Odysseus (Ulysses) as general virtues. But this type of heroism contains a lot of cruelty while the prudence of Odysseus borders with fraud and slyness.

  Achilles Odysseus
Ancient Standards Courageous Prudent
Modern Standards Ferocious Fraudulent

The content of Homeric virtues separates his heroes from Odysseus' son Telemachus as portrayed by Fenelon. While his father is rather mendacious for modern standards he is truthful to the bone and never departs from his noble values.
Note: Fenelon (1651-1715) was a bishop and poet (he composed the poem Telemaque in French).

Example 2:

Hume's second example introduces a comparison between two moralities: Islamic and English. The Quran (Alcoran) praises equity, justice, temperance, meekness, charity, as our Western culture does, but from the point of view of English morality the content of Mohammedan virtues equals treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry.

Islamic morality Equity Justice Temperance Meekness Charity
English morality Treachery Inhumanity Cruelty Revenge Bigotry


Note: This remark does not sound very politically correct (especially in conjunction with the contention that the Koran presents a "wild and absurd performance") but Hume's intention is rather to show (partly in a biased Eurocentric way) the discrepancy between the universality of the accepted precepts and the real sentiments on both sides rather than to assert the superiority of English morality over Arabic mores. At the end of the essay he finds that many events in the Bible present a similar picture of cruelty and inhumanity which he repudiates equally because the most sacred text of the Judeo-Christian tradition not only does not condemn the vicious manners of some biblical heroes but even condones them (cf. God commands the destruction of Jericho and Ai).

Conclusion: There is no standard of morality that universally distinguishes right and wrong. There are no eternal moral norms, only historically and culturally conditioned habits disguised into seeming general precepts. But this generality is more linguistic than real.
Merit: The value of general precepts, commandments and duties is very spurious. The effectiveness of such precepts is questionable. Formulating universal ethical principles is a big stretch. Their strength does not surpass the meaning of the words used. Their import is purely verbal - at best they explicate the implicit positive connotation of certain expressions. For instance by commending charity, virtue, etc., we say that that these notions ar conceived as commendable. It is safer to follow the 'inculcated' (intended) meaning of these words than to derive universal maxims of conduct based on some supposed objective obligations. The writers, preachers and legislators who go for the latter are doomed to be less convincing than what the sheer word semantics suggest. Only what is already contained in the connotation resonates - everything else is a chimera.
Note: Hume's reasoning could be summarized in the following way: Moral precepts either state what is already meant by language or they go beyond it. If the former they are redundant, if the latter they overreach their boundaries.
Application: The same reasoning should apply to aesthetic terms. They, being just condensed expressions of sentiments (of pleasure or displeasure), include some approbation or disapprobation - but they do not warrant any universal and objective rules about objects.

 


2. IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD

Claims: One would expect, based on Hume's general stance and the above observations, that he is going to assert the inescapability of utter subjectivism and relativism in matters of taste. Surprisingly, however, he makes a series of non-skeptical and non-relativist claims:
(1) It is natural to seek a standard of taste.
(2) Such a standard of taste exists.
(3) The standard of taste can reconcile different sentiments.
(4) The standard of taste allows to evaluate different tastes as to their quality and thus decides which one is to be preferred.
Comprehensiveness vs. Discrimination Notice that (3) and (4) are not identical claims. The former suggests the existence of a general and more comprehensive rule, the latter only something that could be used in discriminatory way so that different artworks and aesthetic judgments could be ranked. Hume hopes to be able to find at least (4) if it turns out that the sentiments of men are so different that they cannot be possibly harmonized (3). But throughout the essay he vacillates between these two kinds of standards (the more ambitious one and the more discriminative one).
   
(I) Objection One kind of philosophy (skeptical) opposes the idea that there is any standard of taste. It asserts the equal right of every personal evaluation. In that respect, it agrees with one strain of common sense which preaches the equal value of all taste. These are the main characteristics of this position:
 
Philosophy Skeptical
Common Sense 1st Type
Standard No
Justification Equal Taste
Formula Each to his Own
Outcome No Dispute
Distinction The refusal of any standard of taste is based on one fundamental distinction that sharply separates the nature of sentiments from that of judgments. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between taste and opinion. The former is a matter of feelings, the latter of facts. Other differences could be represented as follows:
 
 
Sentiments
Judgments
Reference Self-referring Objective/Facts
Relation Connection Representation
Outcome Conformity Adequacy
Correctness Multiplicity Singularity
Veracity Undeniable Verification
Contrast As Hume states at the beginning of the essay, there is a huge variety of taste (sentiments) and opinion (judgments). While all sentiments regarding one and the same object are right, only one opinion out of many possible could be right. We can conclusively resolve factual disputes by matching opinions with relevant facts, we cannot but "acquiesce" to our subjective feelings in matters of what we like or dislike. Taste is a kind of sentiment and therefore subjective. There is a parallel between bodily and mental taste to the effect that both are subjective.
Beauty - Deformity Beauty and deformity are not objective qualities. They exist only in the mind as the sentiments of blame and approbation exist in our heart. Some people will regard object beautiful that others perceive as ugly. Therefore it is fruitless to seek the real beauty and deformity as is fruitless to seek the real sweet or real bitter.
Note: The prominence of taste and beauty in the discussion of art is defining for the 18th century aesthetics. Hume is here under influence of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) who held that beauty is not a quality of objects but a subjective idea. Another point of agreement with his contemporaries: mental (aesthetic) taste is very similar in its functioning and status with physiological (bodily) taste. Hume pursues this analogy throughout the essay.
Parallel
Imagination Mental
__
 Taste
Positive Quality Beauty
<=>
Deformity
   
 
Negative Quality Sweet
<=>
 Bitter
Senses Bodily
__
 Taste
If beauty were an objective quality it would beauty is not objective quality then je possible to make objective judgments on it. If beauty is not objective then judgments of taste must be subjective.
Subjective Quality => Individual Subjective Judgment
Objective Quality => Universal Objective Judgment
Subjectivism

What makes something sweet or bitter is the disposition of the organs that are aroused by the perception of certain object. The same holds true of beauty and deformity. The disposition of our organs (that is, its previous or current condition) decides what we'll like or dislike. If we put our left hand in a bucket with cold water while holding the right hand in the bucket with hot water and then both immerse in a vessel.
Aesthetic sentiments like beauty and perfection are in fact more subjective than bodily taste because aesthetic feelings depend ml with lukewarm water we'll have two different sensations.

Aesthetic sentiments like beauty and perfection are in fact more subjective than bodily taste because aesthetic feelings depend more on the consciousness of the perceiving individual and are therefore more idiosyncratic. Therefore it is in vain to seek objective, "real", "true" beauty.

 
Futile
Attainable
Real Beauty Beholder's Eye
Real Deformity Personal Repugnance
Objective Taste Subjective Liking
Conclusion If taste is subjective we must accept the equality of taste which in turn prevents any rational dispute in matters of taste. Taste is irredeemably subjective, individual in scope, culturally and historically conditioned, and therefore relativistic.
Relativistic Sayings:
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.
 Shakespeare (after Greek original)
Each to his own.
Chacun a son gout. (French)
No disputing in matters of taste.
De gustibus non disputandum est. (Latin)

   
(2) Confirmation However, there is another strain of common sense (and another kind of philosophy, although not named by Hume). It recognizes the obvious differences in quality between various artists and artworks and asserts the objectivity and inequality of taste. Some judgments of taste are just plainly wrong whereas some other are obviously right. This position (represented by Thomas Reid) is characterized by the following features:
 
Philosophy Objectivist Criticism
Common Sense 2nd Type
Standard Yes
Justification Inequality of Taste
Formula According to Rules
Outcome Disagreements Irrelevant
Grading The crucial evidence in favor of the non-subjectivity of taste is the possibility of grading artists and the products of art. It would be foolish to claim that there is no difference in rank and quality between a sheer translator, like John Ogilby, and a great poet of a John Milton's stature, or between a mediocre essayist like John Bunyan and a great one like Joseph Addison.
Absurdity Even if somebody would advance the view that these differences do not matter and that the judgments of taste regarding these artists are all equal nobody would pay attention to such a claim because it is in itself implausible and irrelevant. Hume pronounces the sentiment of such a critic absurd and ridiculous despite the previous contention that all sentiments are right.
Similes Any attempt to equalize and level all artists is not less implausible than to negate obvious differences in physical size. It is an "extravagant paradox" or "palpable absurdity". To deny evident qualitative differences would be tantamount to an easily falsifiable factual assertion that a pond is equal to the ocean or a molehill to the great rock of the Tenerife island.

Small
Big
  
Mediocre
Great
Mole-hill Tenerife   Bunyan Addison
Pond Ocean   Ogilby Milton
Disproportion The principle of equality among different tastes cannot be applied to the objects of ostensibly different value and quality. Both experts and regular people realize that great artworks are much more valuable than the "kitsch" products of popular culture even if they like the latter. Everyone agrees that accomplished artists can do more and better than amateurs, etc. Hume notes that this discrepancy is obvious to common sense as well. It is acknowledged by it despite the wide acceptance of the proverb De gustibus non disputandum est.
Conclusion
All artworks are not equally good.
All artists are not equally accomplished.
All judgments of taste are not right.
   
Dilemma The question Hume is facing now is which of the two positions is right. It seems that Hume has to choose between an utterly subjective relativism and the abstract objectivity of aesthetic principles. Apparently this is a difficult choice for a radical empiricist who still believes that his judgment on aesthetic matters is not equal to the taste of a boor.
 

3. RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF TASTE

  Whether aesthetic judgments are objective and universal or subjective and relativistic is one of the most hotly debated issues in Aesthetics.
Relativism It is clear that Hume does not espouse aesthetic relativism even though it would be consistent with his general theory of sentiments and his contention that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.
Objectivism However, he does not accept objectivism either. Especially not in the form of a priori rules of composition or "abstract conclusions" derived from eternal and steady relations of ideas.
He remains convinced that the rules of art are not rational, universal and necessary.
"It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasoning a priori..."
Solution So what is Hume's solution to the above problem of two contradictory views on taste? He does not have a straight one; he rather struggles to get around the unpleasant dilemma of choosing between relativism and objectivism. What he suggests sounds like a middle way (an intermediate ground) between these two extremes: he accepts that differences in rank and quality are too evident to be ignored but still clings to his starting belief that aesthetic judgments are just expressions of our sentiments which do not represent anything in objects.
Rules In a nutshell, his solution is: There are general rules but they are all empirical and contingent. They are more a summary of what pleases than an explanation of what constitutes good art. Therefore they are not universally binding.
Note: Unfortunately, Hume does not give a single example of these rules and principles that would allow us to get a grasp of their nature. As some authors have noticed, he proceeds as if they do not really exist or in fact are not really rules.
Compromise Anyway, he defines his position on these rules by means of the following four statements:
(1) Rules exist.
(2) They are empirical (experiential not logical).
(3) They are general (comprising all cultures and all ages).
(4) But they are based on sentiments (that what pleases overall).

As irregularities can please (falsehood, metaphor, perversion), exact rules do not work in art.
 

As far as the source and nature of these rules are concerned, Hume rejects the rationalist theory of their origin and adopts a thoroughly empirical view. The contrast between what he regards as the real rules and those that are commonly envisioned but not existent could be represented in the following way:
Rules of Composition
 
Real
Illusionary
Origin Experience Reasoning a priori
Status General Observation Abstract Conclusions / Exactness
Validation Factual Pleasure Eternal Norms

If the standard of taste is based on experience and derived from the observations of common sentiments then the supposed "rules of compositions" cannot be but sheer empirical generalizations of what is accepted. All the more so as they are not necessary. What matters is whether something pleases or not, for pleasant sentiments decide ultimately what should count as a rule.
Exactness Owing to their empirical nature the rules do not apply geometrically and in a formulaic manner. The role of art criticism is not to enforce these rules mechanically by suppressing any departure from them. A work composed exactly according to a steady canon of hard rules would be dull and unconvincing.
The Middle These admonitions resemble Aristotle's statements on the right method of ethics. It seems that Hume has transferred some of these ideas into the realm of aesthetics (right measure, lack of scientific exactness, need to create the right disposition and identify the right situation for judging, etc.)
 
Poetry Geometric Exactness General Rules
Possession Not Yes
Nature Scientific Observation Genius
Genius If there are some rules they should be binding, that is to say, we need to see them defining taste. Still Hume insists that the rules discovered by acute observation are binding for poetry. But he does not state a single one that could be tested as binding. On the contrary, he says that we cannot engineer any great art by simply following the rules. On the other hand he allows that they could be discovered by inspiration (genius) as well. Hume was too much of a connoisseur not to realize that art emerges in a creative and innovative way.
Note: Genius and taste were the privileged topics of the 18th century aesthetics. It is noteworthy that Hume allows the possibility of a shortcut in the painstaking empirical process of ascertaining the rule - it is a possibility open to exceptional creators or individuals with a true taste.
Expressions Throughout the essay Hume uses several expressions when speaking about these rules. They indicate both the various aspects of these rules as well as his uncertainty about their true status. These are his main four phrases with their prevalent significations:
General Rules of Art What pleases in all times and countries
General Rules of Composition Avowed Patterns
General Rules of Beauty Established Models
General Principles of Approbation Uniform Sentiments

The common trait in all these formulas is that they all presume the recipient's position rather than any objective features of the artwork.
Exceptions Another reason why universal, abstract and mechanical rules are not possible in art is that art allows deformities and distortions of every kind. We simply cannot regulate art if we do not want to kill its spontaneity. The flexible rules of art do not rule out every single aberration. Distortion is permissible in art as well as falsehood and fiction. A departure from the rules could still yield a great artwork despite some deformities.
- These deformities are overpowered by qualities.
- Some deformities can please. In that case they are not faults.
- Some rules are a matter of inspiration.
Note: Hume's example of a successful artwork that includes distortions and exaggerations is Ariosto's Furious Orlando. From visual arts he could have cited El Greco or Alessandro Magnasco with their overextended figures and exaggerated movements.
Deformities How these artworks please notwithstanding their fantastic sallies? Hume's answer is that they please in spite of their transgressions owing to some other qualities that in fact represent these rules. The pleasure arising from these qualities must overpower the displeasure stemming from deformities, that is to say, the negative impact of transgressions must not surpass the total tally of positive qualities.

Note: The most Hume is ready to allow for deformities and exaggerations is that they could occur without compromising all artistic value; inventiveness and "clarity of expression" render the violations of rules non-important. But Hume vehemently denies that aesthetic quality could reside in these violations themselves. According to Hume, Ariosto's poem pleases owing to its charms and accomplishments, not because of its imperfections and deformities.
  An artwork can combine and in reality combines perfections with the components that are less than perfect. The chart below brings a pretty exhaustive inventory of these aspects in Ariosto:
Deformity Improbable monstrous fiction Bizarre mixture of serious and comic Want of coherence Continual interruptions
Charm Force of expression Clarity of expression Variety of inventions Natural pictures of passion
Principle


Deformities do not please. Nobody can enjoy them. If the rules of composition are derived from what generally pleases, then we cannot say that deformities are being enjoyed because that would contradict the very nature of the rules extracted from pleasurable emotions (approval of object). We can say in general: Nothing that does not please is art. In general, rules contribute to the increase of pleasure.

Rules of Art = Increase of Satisfaction

On the other hand, what pleases cannot be a fault.

  If Turn to
Rules Decrease satisfaction Faults
Faults Increase Satisfaction Aesthetic Qualities

If departures from the rules please they are not deformities. Hence art criticism must adjust its normative judgments to what actually pleases. Therefore the fact that a supposed fault pleases does not undermine the standing of art criticism if it acknowledges the fact. The above principles tying taste with pleasure delineate the realm of art.

Note: This equation between pleasure and art threatens to compromise the distinction between good and bad art since "bad art" could be very popular (take Thomas Kinkade or Jack Vittriano). Notice, however, that Hume does not proclaim the principle "Everything that pleases is art"; he does not say "Nothing that pleases is not art." either.

Foundation (1) The general rules of art are founded on experience.
(2) Therefore they could be discovered by observation: "General observations concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and all ages."
(3) If there is something that pleases universally this in turn implies that human nature has some common traits that produce common sentiments despite cultural and historical differences.
  Another consequence of the relation between the form and the organ is that there must be something in the artwork that is calculated to please.
Relation
If taste is a matter of feelings provoked by the object then aesthetic experience consists in the following relation:

SUBJECT<...........................................................OBJECT
SENTIMENT<..........................................................FORM

Imagination, which stands on the side of the subject, mediates between the two poles. This means that our sentiments are not just a passive reflection of the object.
  Artistic experience is neither an objective reflection nor a subjective perception of the object but a relation mediated by imagination.
 

IMAGINATION
SENTIMENT<................................................>FORM
Expectation In view of common human nature this relation gives rise to the expectation that our sentiments will be uniform when exposed to the same object under the same circumstances. Furthermore this suggests that we can derive a universal aesthetic model ("catholic beauty") from that uniformity.
  Common Human Nature}
.................................=> Uniformity of Sentiments=> Catholic Beauty
Same Objects Perceived}
Discrepancy However, this does not happen always, perhaps not even often. If human organs (the senses) function similarly why we do not feel the same sentiments of pleasure when exposed to the same objects of tested appreciation? If there are general rules based on these uniformities one would expect that our sentiments would conform to them all the time. Why is this not the case?
Hume's answer is twofold:
Internal Organ
Human sentiments make (1) a very complex and sensitive whole. Many factors are involved in their workings and they all need to fit into the process. This is true particularly of the "finer emotions of the mind" that are very delicate and require a simultaneous "concurrence" of many factors, both external and internal, in order to allow the proper functioning of the entire sensitive complex.
 
External Internal
Suitable Situation Proper Disposition
No external hindrance. No internal disorder.
Sound State According to the analogy with the physiological taste, Hume asserts that there are two states of our mind: sound and defective. Only the former should serve as the basis for relevant aesthetic judgments (affording a standard of taste). If a proven quality fails to please somebody the reason lies in the organ - it must be defective or imperfect.
For instance, a person with fever cannot discern different flavors, a person who is color blind cannot properly distinguish colors.
External Circumstances Second, the sentiments could be manifested in a uniform manner only under a very favorable combination of external circumstances. They include both (a) internal and (b) external conditions.

These are some of the conditions mentioned by Hume:
Conditions
Internal Conditions
External Conditions
Good State Proper Time
Serene Mind Proper Place
Collected Thought No Disturbance
Due Attention No Impediment
Equality of Circumstances Hume claims that there are certain rules which arise from the common human nature assuming that human mind operates under the same conditions and with the same quality of organs. If this is not the case the sentiments will, of course, vary. Therefore the test ("experiment") whether there is general agreement in sentiments is valid only if all the above conditions are equally in place.
Catholic Beauty If these conditions are met a Catholic (= Greek for universal) beauty could be derived from the common human nature operating under normal conditions. Practically, this means it could be perceived only when all internal impediments and external hindrances are eliminated.
Remove the obstructions - the beauty (a generalization to be sure) will excite agreeable sentiments.
Non-Objective Clue This may suggest that there is an objective substratum of aesthetic beauty. If under equal conditions all (or the majority) of subjects will feel the same sentiments there must be something out there that triggers this uniformity. But this is not what Hume maintains. Even when all positive conditions of perception are met we cannot perceive beauty as an objective quality. Nor can we figure out the relation between the form and the sentiment by simply focusing on particular aesthetic qualities.
External
Parameters 		Aesthetic qualities could be better and easier ascertained from the wide acceptance and lasting appreciation that may attend the artwork than through detection of some inherent features.
Thus generality and durability define what is aesthetically valuable rather than some particular forms or some pre-defined rules for artists.
Standards
  
Character
Social criterion Width General admiration.
Historical criterion Longevity Durable admiration.
Physiological criterion Identity Uniform admiration
They also serve as the test of validity across different cultures and throughout historical periods thus eliminating the impact of distortions and barriers (herd instinct and authority). Time and again they show that something just fashionable is temporary, something just local transitory (ephemeral).
Transition We see that Hume moves from (1) the rules for artists to (2) that what by nature pleases the audience but finally lands at (3) the point of wide acceptance. These social and historical dimensions account both for individual differences and for pseudo-objective character of good taste.
Evidence Classical authors like Homer and Cicero are still admired.
Therefore they have withstood all cultural, religious and linguistic changes in the wy how people perceive them. Does it mean that they embody the general rules of art? No.
Hume mentions Homer's epics as an example of wide approbation, not as exemplary works. He does not say "any work like Homer's epic will be a successful poem and hence widely admired". He only states a fact that illustrates his point about admiration as the decisive parameter. But he adds some objectivity to the requirement of admiration and acceptance by dissolving the cultural and social pressure on the current taste in the flow of time. No single individual, no single group, no single society or culture possess the final word on taste.
Durable Admiration


Durability and the extent of admiration are not only sociological parameters but the statements of quality as well. Posterity and foreign cultures are therefore a good test of aesthetic value. If something is approved by others and future generations it is a good candidate for lasting appreciation.
A real genius only gains approval when tested by posterity and across different cultures.
Note: If an artist like Francesco Francia is not any longer admired as he was in the 19th century this means that his work has not passed the judgment of time and has not gained a lasting and universal acceptance. If we drop Whistlers portrait of his mother from the most authoritative survey of art history, this suggests that we do not look at it as one of the best paintings of the time, as was the case half a century ago.

Conditions
Physical Psychological Physiological
External Mental Internal
Situation Disposition Organs
Standard The standard of taste consists in certain general principles of approbation and blame. These could be discovered in all operations of the mind.
They are based on (a) some common traits of human nature, and (b) some particular forms (qualities) designed to please. a and b correlate as organs sentiments, not as objects and sentiments.
Sentiments are still decisive in forming our taste but only those received under optimal conditions, in the right manner and by a wide audience, really conform to the rules. Or better to say, the above rules of art and composition exist only as manifested in equal and favorable conditions and attested by a wide and durable admiration.
Perfect Beauty

Now all this can explain the uniformity of bodily taste and the 'catholic' beauty insofar as it coincides with the normal, average beauty. But Hume goes beyond the proper functioning of our organs, the common traits of human nature and wide acceptance of the work; he introduces an aesthetic quality perceived by the mental taste of the connoisseurs.
If in the sound state of the organ emerges a "considerable uniformity of sentiments" among men it would be possible to derive from it "an idea of perfect beauty". Hume compares this idea of perfect beauty to the regular perceptions of colors under normal conditions (= "true and real color") regardless whether they really exist or not, but views it still as something more than normal beauty. It is obviously the catholic beauty + the highest quality at one as the proper perception of a color reveals the 'true' nature of the object.


Note: Hume makes an analogy between seeing physical objects under normal conditions and perceiving them aesthetically when the internal senses work properly. As Theodore Gracyk has pointed out, this analogy is problematic for two reasons: (1) mental taste is never direct but mediated through reflection, (2) a standard of taste requires more than a normal function - it requires a refined detection of a higher quality. See for this: http://www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil%20of%20art/hume_and_kant.htm
Gap Thus there is a leap from the bodily taste which reaches the uniformity if both internal and external conditions are met and the aesthetic quality that is apprehended by some only and requires a bit more than normal functioning of organs. Hume proceeds as if the initial problem of an aesthetic standard could be resolved in the same manner as the standardization of bodily taste: Only those generally observed sentiments that are received under favorable conditions while internal organs function properly could serve as the basis for a standard of taste. But these are only necessary, not sufficient conditions for apprehension of the standard. As we will see shortly, only the sentiments of some subjects count as authoritative, not the sentiments of all normal human people. Moreover, normal, reasonable and educated people may differ in their aesthetic judgments even when they perceive the same objects and act under similar circumstances. Therefore the analogy ("resemblance") with bodily taste cannot account fully for the differences in aesthetic judgments.
  General Rules <-------Forms
-------------------> Uniformity of Sensations
Common Nature <----Observation
Objective Quality Hume indirectly concedes that some objective qualities must be responsible for producing the sentiment of beauty under normal conditions. We may think about some proportions like the "Golden section" that please almost universally which will be in keeping with the phrases "catholic beauty", "the force of beauty". Hume indeed admits that some particular forms "from the original structure of the internal fabric" are calculated to please and other to displease, which logically implies that they cause respective feelings, but eventually contends that the beauty results from the arousal of certain feelings and not from these objective qualities themselves. Some objects are "naturally calculated to give pleasure" but that ultimately happens "by the structure of the mind", not due to their inherent features .
Note: Nonetheless, there must be something in the object that causes the pleasant feeling that translates into the experience of beauty. Otherwise everything could produce the same feelings if we are in a particular state of mind. Hume does not explain what is that quality. He only acknowledges that a relation between the form and sentiment exists. Thus his rules seem to be not about the object but about the relation between the object and the organ that gives rise to the sentiment. Imagination is the mediating force that is mysteriously responsible for the quality of our reactions.

4. REQUISITES OF TASTE

Subjectivity Although Hume indicates that some objective qualities may be responsible for the respective feeling of beauty ("it must be allowed that there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce these particular feeling"), he does not analyze these qualities beyond the above mentioned general assertion focusing instead on the qualities a good art critic must possess. This shift toward subjectivity is in itself more consistent with the first (the skeptical) strain of common sense that asserts the equality of tastes, but Hume still wants to curb the excessive subjectivism and relativism by narrowing down the range of approvable divergent feelings and the number of competent subjects.
Qualification Different situations will certainly prompt or hinder the same sentiments about the same objects - imagination will receive different sentiments to work with and its judgments will be different. This is unavoidable and normal. But the impact of the projected general principles of art is weakened not only by ever changing external circumstances and some internal physiological defects - it could be severely limited due to the absence of some abilities and capacities in the mental constitution of the judging subject. It is possible that two subjects both judge in the sound state of their organs, that they experience the same object under the same conditions and yet pass different judgments. Thus the equality of those necessary conditions does not guarantee the uniformity of judgment and the same quality of taste.
Features The reason for this is that good taste requires more than normal internal and favorable external conditions. Positive qualities may be present in barely discernible quantities, mixed or covered by other more visible features. Hume realizes this and in addition to the proper external and internal conditions of our organs defines 6 extra requisites that, if present, substantially contribute to the good quality of taste or serve as its recognizable characteristics. And the other way round, if absent they impede the manifestation of good taste. Whereas the circumstances of proper functioning are necessary neutral preconditions that do not qualitatively determine their outcomes these 6 requisites together define the normative aspect of a good taste that drives a critical wedge among the variety of possible subjective tastes ("amidst the caprice of taste"). Only taste that emerges from these features and joins the taste of other similarly minded subjects is in conformity with the standard of quality because its inter-subjectivity represents the true measure of aesthetic value and judgment. Of course, this is a more specific criterion than the wide and durable acceptance which comes down to an average notwithstanding the fact that Hume correlates the verdict of connoisseurs with the historically and socially established models.
Summary Argument: There is a variety of taste. It does not warrant the equality of taste. For there is a standard of taste that determines what is good and what is bad taste. This standard is derived from a general observation of what pleases. It is formulated in the rules of art.
Objections: (a) Artist: If there are rules give me them to create great art.
(b) Audience: Given our common nature we should all feel the same when exposed to the same object.
Hume's response: (a) One cannot create art by following instructions. Art is about invention, creativity, inspiration, genius. (b) There is no uniformity of sentiments because rarely all conditions are the same: (1) external (physical), (2) mental (psychological), and internal (physiological).
Question: What if all the conditions are met (pretty much the same)? Will we have the supposed unanimity?
Answer: No, because even then there will be differences in the ability that Hume calls delicacy.
   
(1) Delicacy The first and the most important feature of good taste is delicacy of imagination (in keeping with the habits of his time Hume attributes delicacy to the workings of "imagination" - imagination was in general regarded as the organ of mental taste).
Delicacy is a common word, as important now as it was in the time of Hume. However, there is a big difference in the usage. While we understand the word predominantly in the sense of mindfulness for other people's feelings, sensitivity and gingerly conduct, Hume defines delicacy as the ability of discerning the smallest ingredients in the composition of the whole.
Sancho's Story To illustrate his point Hume adapts an anecdote from Cervantes' Don Quixote: Two kinsmen of Sancho Panza, both reputed for being wine connoisseurs, passed two conflicting judgment of taste concerning one hogshead of old wine. The first said it was good but noted a slight taste of leather, the other also approved the wine but detected a slight taste of iron in it. Both were ridiculed because of these conflicting findings until at the bottom of the hogshead an old key was found with a leathern thong which vindicated both men.
  Note: Hume amends the version of Cervantes to make it applicable to the discernment of "minute qualities" and the qualitative assessment of the whole. While Cervantes does not mention any normative evaluation of the wine as wine (only the presence of iron and leather), Hume adds the judgment of quality ("wine is good") in order to establish an agreement in the critical discernment of the aesthetic value which provides the analogy with the bodily taste of the two.
Analogy Hume interprets the anecdote in accordance with the analogy between bodily and mental taste. "The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste easily teach us how to apply this story." The application should illustrate delicacy both in its "literal" and its "metaphorical" sense. I take this to refer to physiological and aesthetical taste respectively.
LITERAL DELICACY METAPHORICAL DELICACY
Bodily Taste Mental Taste
Experts Connoisseurs
Detecting Small Quantities
Ingredients 		Evaluating Small Qualities
Aesthetical
Differences Hume says again that beauty and deformity refer to the sentiments and not to the qualities in object. As far as aesthetic qualities are concerned they "belong more than sweet and bitter" to our subjectivity and therefore lend themselves less to the process of normalization. On the other hand, he reverses himself partially in allowing that "there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings".
Physiological Acuity By identifying two aspects of the key on a leathern thong the two kinsmen detected precisely these "qualities" (in fact ingredients) in the object although they were imperceptible for others. Both of them demonstrated thus an impressive acuity in detecting extremely small ingredients in the whole. Although each detected a different residue they were both right.
Note: Hume speaks about small qualities of the subject, but these correspond in fact to the residue ingredients and should be better labeled as small quantities of components. Qualities should be reserved for aesthetic ingredients.
Simile Now Hume claims that producing the general rules or awoved patterns of composition is like finding the key with a leathern thong.
This rehashes the previous hint that the knowledge about the objective qualities that generate pleasant sentiments would help us figure out whether a particular sentiment is right or not. In both cases we obtain a powerful means to identify the right judgment and refute those that are faulty.
 
  Subjective Objective
Bodily taste Perceiving different qualities Relating to different qualities
Mental taste Having different sentiments Formulating general rules
Test The test should work in the opposite way from the above table:
First, start from the general rules of beauty that are drawn from the established models and general observation of what pleases or displeases when present singly and in a high degree. If in possession of good taste the subject should be in conformity with the avowed patterns.
Then, present that what pleases in a smaller degree and in a continued composition (mixed).
If the subject does not react (the organs remain unaffected either by delight or uneasiness) s/he does not possess the delicacy of taste even though s/he may acknowledge the general rules and discern these qualities when they are isolated or very intensive.
Elitism Conversely, a good judge or critic will discover aesthetic qualities in an artwork that are not visible for the majority of common observers. But the standard should not be grasped by only a few - that would be too elitist and would jeopardize the criterion of wide and durable acceptance.
Circularity If there is a rule that establishes the rightness of certain sentiments as responses to certain stimuli, then, in order to avoid a circle in reasoning, this rule should not be embodied in people who respond in accordance with the rule.
Note: Aristotle encountered a similar difficulty in trying to explain how we become virtuous by acting as virtuous individuals would act. As is known, he showed that this is not a circle since we can gradually acquire the excellence we do not possess at the moment we take action.
Hypothesis What would happen if such a test is not conducted? That is if the hogshead has never been emptied? In both cases the difference between fine and languid taste would exist, although as unproved and undemonstrated. The different degrees of taste will continue to subsist in art (writing is specifically mention) even if the beauties are not explicated by means of rules and no excellent models have been recognized. Therefore, the judgments of different people will not be equally acceptable although it would be more difficult to show the superiority of good state, rebut the bad judge and to silence the bad critic who relies stubbornly on his imperfect particular sentiment.
 
Bodily Taste Finding Key Not Finding Key Majority Strengthen Differences in Delicacy exist
Mental Taste General Rules Rules Not Methodized Bad Critic not refuted Difference of Good and Bad Taste subsists
Aesthetic Propriety This is Hume's addition to the story that stretches it so to include the judgment of quality. The original tale lends support only to the physiological kind of taste - the one that detects even the small ingredients.

Strictly speaking the two aspects are independent, although it is certainly no accident that those who are capable of detecting almost negligible material components can pass a better value judgment than those who do not possess the same physiological sensitivity.
 
Analogy Type Judgment Outcome Organ
Sancho's Story Bodily Taste Wine: good/bad Finding Leather/Iron Senses
Aesthetic Application Mental Taste Beauty/Deformity Producing General Rules Imagination

The ability to discern some qualities that are less "subjective", like the above features, lends additional credence to the overall judgment.
Resolution Hume optimistically states that it is possible to resolve aesthetic disagreements by producing avowed principles of art along with appropriate examples that manifest those principles.
Once this is done we need simply to show that the accepted principles apply in a particular case and that the absence of corresponding sentiments is to be atributed to the lack of delicacy in the subject who had acknowledged the previous illustration of the principle.
 
Bodily Taste: Mental Taste: = Unity:
Perfection of Senses Perfection of Taste Personal Perfection
Exact Perception of objects Quick and acute Perception of Beauty Delicate taste
Minute objects observed All excellencies observed Finest enjoyment of human nature
Perfection Hume defines the perfection of a sense as the ability to perceive the smallest object in its domain without overlooking anything.
Proportion: The smaller are the perceived objects the more perfect is the sense (organ).
Test: The quality of the sense should be tried by a mixture of small ingredients, not by isolated and strong flavors.
Analogy: A quick and acute perception of beauty attests the perfection of our mental taste. If some excellencies or blemishes go unnoticed the perfection is not complete.
 
  Normal Functioning Delicate Functioning
Discernment Single Qualities, High Degree Minute Qualities,
Mixed Qualities
Unity The perfection of the sense and the perfection of the subject coincide - they are united in the person of a good judge - somebody with a fine taste. Although the possession of "delicate palate" maybe occasionally embarrassing both for the subject and his environment, in general delicate taste is a blessing and "the source of all finest and most innocent enjoyments" in life that otherwise does not offer much.
Note: This pleasure seems to be greater than the one derived from doing philosophy regarded by Hume just as a pastime.
Recognition How to ascertain the presence of that unity (perfection of the sense + delicacy of taste)?
By invoking those models and principles that have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages. If they match the judgment of the person s/he is a good judge (perfect judge); if s/he is the good judge their judgments will be in accord with that consensus.
   
(2) Practice It is an unfortunate fact of life that people do not possess the same delicacy of taste. But the lack of delicacy is not a destiny - it could be treated and even ameliorated. The best method to improve the delicacy is (a) "practice in particular art", and (b) "frequent survey or contemplation of a particular species of beauty". The two are one assuming that practice denotes exposure more than execution.
Experience Hume does not elaborate on the first part of his advice - seek more experience in an art through practice - but it is abundantly confirmed by experience. Practicing both in the sense of execution and exposure widely opens the gate to the art in question both in terms of dexterity and knowledge: we may not be the most talented individuals but even our amateurish execution will be improved and our judgment will become more reliable. There is an obvious connection between these two aspects. Experience and exposure may lead to the familiarity with the art that only practical dexterity can provide.
 
PRACTICE
 EXPERIENCE
OUTCOME
Dexterity in Execution
 Familiarity in Observation
Good Judgment
  Only those who are familiar with the nature of particular art and know firsthand the difficulty of putting together all the components can really appreciate the final performance. But they need first to develop the ability of identifying, discerning and evaluating particular excellencies or defects by repeatedly exposing themselves to the artworks.
 
  Insufficient Practice   Good Practice
 
INABILITY
  
ABILITY
Observation To Perceive Several Excellences or Defficiences Parts To Perceive Beauties / Defects
Discernment To Discern Particular Character Nature To Distinguish Species of Quality
Evaluation To Ascertain Quality and Degree Whole To Suitable Assign Praise / Blame
(3) Frequent Perusal
Hume is also right in his second point - that frequent and repeated exposure to the objects of art proves immensely beneficial to their better assessment. And the other way round, unfamiliarity with the objects of perception hinders a reliable judgment. The most one can expect when first seeing something is to pass a very general judgment about the whole. Mostly in the manner of "I like it" or "I do not like it." The only way to detect particular excellences and overcome the starting unfamiliarity with their nature is to get acquainted with the object through repeated attentive and deliberate surveys from different angles and in different situations (in other words, go to the museum several times, listen to the musical piece repeatedly, read a poem again, etc.). Below is the comparative table of outcomes after first and after repeated observations:
 
First Observation
Multiple Observations
General at Best - the Whole Discerned Particular Characters
Compressed Relations and Merits Exact Quality and Degree
Confused and Obscure Sentiments Clear and Distinct Sentiments
Advantages Repeated surveys of an artwork are much more productive than its first or a single perusal. Hume mentions several aspects of improvement that really make a difference:
 
First Glance
Frequent Perusal
Thought Fluterred and hurried Focused and attentive
Relation Parts not discerned Parts distingiuished
Style Not recognized Identified Character
Quality Florid and Superficial Compatible with Expression
Presentation Defects and Perfections mixed together Defects and Perfections discerned
Sentiment Confounded Clear

In brief, repeated surveys enrich our artistic experience by helping overcome the initial confusion, precise first impression and articulate the whole work.
   
(4) Comparison Observation and evaluation of artworks is tremendously enhanced by comparison. It is twofold:
Comparison of different species
Comparison of particular excellences
Estimation of mutual proportion

Comparing helps determine mutual relations between different pieces, their rankorder ("order of beauty") and the relative value of particular qualities. In other words, it is the foundation for making any statement involving good, less good, better, or the best in the realm of art.
Epithets Such a statement presupposes different degrees of blameable or praiseworthy qualities. Blame and praise target the following characteritics:
BLAME
PRAISE
Inferiority Superiority
Deformity Excellence
Vulgarity Perfection
Sketchiness Completeness</