PHL 358
Instructor: Dr. Bob Zunjic

JEAN PAUL SARTRE

The Humanism of Existentialism I

(1946)

Origin:

Sartre published this essay in 1946 as a transcribed version of a public lecture he delivered a year before (October 29, 1945). By publishing the text of an oral presentation Sartre originally intended to provide a more readable exposition of his phenomenological ontology (the name he previously accepted for his own philosophy), but the condensed and sometimes ambiguous formulations have caused some new misinterpretations so that at the end he almost regretted the publication of the lecture.

Some commentators tend to downplay the import of this essay by calling by just the most popular but at the same time the least elaborated piece of Sartre's philosophy. After careful reading one should be rather inclined to look at it as an extremely interesting and provocative statement of existentialist philosophy. Despite all its shortcomings 'The Humanism of Existentialism' still remains the best short exposition of the main existentialist topics.

Title

Note: A more literal rendering of the title would be "Existentialism is a Humanism" (in French: Existentialisme est un Humanisme). By claiming that "existentialism is a humanism" Sartre does not want to say that existentialism is a kind of "Red Cross" (humanitarian) philosophy. He rather wishes to place his version of existentialism into the mainstream of the libertarian humanist tradition that could be traced back to the Renaissance and its stress on human creativity and freedom. The immediate precursor of this terminology was Kojeve, who interpreted Hegel's theology of Spirit as disguised (atheistic) humanism in which all supposed attributes of God should be transferred to Man. Man forges his destiny, not natural or transcendent powers. Therefore he is responsible for his actions and their consequences.  Sartre, who occasionally attended Kojeve's lectures, obviously accepted this reversal of theology. In that sense the rendering "the humanism of existentialism" (Bernard Frechtman), though not absolutely faithful, hits the mark even better than any literal translation of the title.

Objective:

The unstated objective of the essay is to expound Sartre's own philosophy as existentialism and to explain existentialism in terms of Sartre's own philosophy. With this combination in mind Sartre is taking over an already existing and widely (ab)used term he is now intent to redefine so that it can serve a serious philosophical purpose. The justification for this conceptual rehabilitation is that the term "existentialism" was at the time so stretched in different applications ("so broad a meaning") that its signification has become very elusive and sometimes even frivolous (covering sheer vulgarities). In opposition to this indiscriminate linguistic expansion Sartre is committed to take it in a very technical sense, which would restrict its usage to a particular (his) philosophical doctrine. To distance himself from the popular vulgarizations of existentialism Sartre even calls its core "the most austere of doctrines", which is an obvious exaggeration.

Charges:

The critics, either of Marxist or Catholic provenance or both, leveled the following common charges against existentialism:

(1) Hopeless Passivism. By asserting that human action is futile, if not impossible, existentialism invites people to remain in a state of "desperate quietism", resigned and passive. Existentialism itself ends up in a kind of "contemplative bourgeois philosophy" (just observing the world) lagging behind the demand of Marx' 11th Thesis on Feuerbach which stipulates that philosophy should change the world - not only look at it. The word bourgeois in the charge was linked to luxury in the sense of being redundant and unnecessary.

(2) Disappointing Negativity. By over-emphasizing the sordid and the "dark side" of human nature existentialism propounds human degradation the way "naturalism" used to expose the worst human traits in the nineteenth century. Thus existentialism tendentiously neglects the greatness and magnificence of human race. Or at least that there is always something consoling.

(3) Individualistic Isolationism. By taking pure subjectivity as the starting point and by treating man as an isolated being existentialism disregards the social character of man and his innate inclination toward solidarity. No coincidence that existentialism commits this distortion, for it is a heir of Cartesianism which has conceived human existence as an isolated mind entirely enclosed into subjective consciousness.

(4) Dangerous Permissiveness. By rejecting God's commandments and the "eternal verities" existentialism delivers human undertakings to "pure caprice" and arbitrary evaluations. It denies the validity of objective standards and norms of human conduct and preaches a pernicious relativism.

Strategy:

Sartre believes that the best way to defend himself against charges 1 through 4 is to tackle briefly the main themes of existentialism and while doing this to correct the misconceptions in the common reception of existentialism. Most specifically he wants to peel away the superficial mantle surrounding the strictly philosophical core of existentialism.

The last question is the easiest to answer: since what we believe is relevant for who we are and our identity is of utmost concern for existentialism the question of God becomes a watershed in many respects. No other philosophical orientation (with the possible exception of Marxism) chastises disengagement of the knowing subject from its subject-matter. On the contrary, they all favor a clear detachment of the person's creeds from his theoretical statements thus making the content of their propositions "indifferent" for the thinker himself. For existentialism, this type of detachment is self-deceptive and untenable especially with regard to the belief or dis-belief in God (cf. Kierkegaard's critique of this attitude in Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Therefore, it makes a big philosophical difference whether a thinker himself relates his existence to God or not. This circumstance answers the second question as well.

The first problem is a bit more complex. Sartre contends that despite all disagreements as to the belief in God (all?) existentialist thinkers share the idea that (a) "existence precedes essence". But according to Sartre's own stipulations, this does not hold true equally for both groups of existentialist thinkers. And precisely (a) is brought up by Sartre as the defining characteristic of existentialism. This discrepancy suggests that the said "complication" is much more serious than Sartre is ready to admit: it either disqualifies the suggested common ground or it disqualifies all Christian existentialists as existentialists. In the latter case the "they" from "what they have in common" refers probably only to group B. In fact, Sartre adumbrates later on that theistic existentialists are less consequent than his strand of Existentialism.

Note: The priority of existence excludes all traditional and modern concepts of what does it mean to be a human: to conform to the "Form of Humanness" (Plato), to realize the "Function of Man" (Aristotle), to embody the "idea of humanity" (Kant), to display a specific "generic code", to possess "human genome", etc. Whatever version it takes, human nature denotes something that is present in each and every man, something common to all men, something composed of innate, hereditary and spontaneous traits. If formulated in this way the concept of human nature suggests an invariable identity (a totality of shared features and abilities) which in advance determines what we are. This in turn implies a possibility to provide a universal definition that would be applicable to all men. But such an all-embracing definition is exactly what Sartre renounces because, (a) it denies our individuality, and (b) it refutes our freedom and involvement in making ourselves.

Sartre: As it will become clear in the last part of the essay, man is, for Sartre, the sum total of his acts, not the manifestation of an inner natural essence. Therefore a universal human nature does not exist, only a perpetual formative process which is culturally and historically determinable although not absolutely determined. Later on Sartre indicates that there is a duality between the "absoluteness" of existence and "the relativeness of each epoch", but he claims that it has the form of "connection" between "the absolute character of free involvement by virtue of which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of mankind" and the "relativeness of the cultural ensemble which may result from such a choice".

Note: This reasoning could be associated with the idea from Marx' The Capital that there are two "human natures", one that persists throughout different epochs and the other one that historically changes. But Sartre abolishes any difference between the universality of existential configuration and the historically localized existence. Later in the essay he mentions some "objective" conditions that "are to be found everywhere and (that) are recognizable everywhere". But he insists that the "configurations" of these conditions, although universal, are not given, but "perpetually being made". Thus freedom always overpowers determination.

Critics: If there is no human essence and if "human nature" does not exists how can we talk about "man" in the first place? Is not "man" something general, something that must be determinable one way or another in order to be a meaningful notion? Not only philosophical nativists but the majority of human scientists surmise in a way that existence precedes essence. But they believe that this existence has a nature that could be defined by making reference to some essential traits like bi-pedalism, agile hands, sophisticated vocal cords, big brains, or whatever else that appears to be a distinctive mark of being human. Nobody cannot exist, act, think etc., without being something in the first place and man also must be what he is if he exists. In the same vein contemporary neurologists claim that there is a kind of built-in soft-ware that accounts for our behavior and thoughts. This priority of "essence" does not reduce existence to an external unfolding nor does it make essence unchangeable and derivable from an a priori definition of man. But it makes a pure existence an impossible concept.

Note: The existentialist denial of human nature could be viewed as the most recent (atheistic) version of the old anti-essentialist objections to the idea that one can define man by virtue of a standard and universal definition. This tradition had started with the empiricist thesis that human mind is a "blank slate" and it has found its continuation in the anthropologist conviction that the overwhelming impact of culture makes "human nature" so maleable that it ultimately ceases to be a real nature. To be sure, Sartre does not negate the concept of human nature in the name of history and culture so that these become a kind of anonymous substitutes for the old nature. This was the position of Marxism aimed at demonstrating the need for a comprehensive social change. However, the rejection of human nature is not necessarily progressive. It could have opposite practical consequences. Yes, it could increase the awareness of differences and so raise the level of tolerance, but it could equally lead to exclusion and various forms of supremacy. On the other hand, precisely the idea of human nature in general can provide a powerful argument for the affirmation of equal human rights although its scientific foundation must remain normatively neutral.

When existentialists say that man is "existence" do they in fact sell existence as a new essence of man only this time by avoiding to name it? Sartre would agree in a sense with this but he would contend that human existence is not an abstract a priori definable essence. At most it is my own individual identity that I create by formulating my life-plan based on my actions and choices. For Sartre, "a man is nothing else than a series of undertakings" that spring from his fundamental choices. If there is a human nature, it is always behind or away from man, either something already surpassed and obsolete, or something to be accomplished but never fully actualized. The question is, of course, does this mean "that there are no characteristics whatsoever that we must have in order for us to exist as human beings" (Guignon and Pereboom)? And if so, what would make us distinguishable from other beings? Sartre's answer is paradoxical: our distinguishing mark is precisely this that we do not possess such characteristics.

Note: Sartre does not have to shun from paradoxical twists like the one which says that the only nature of man is that he does not have one or that existence is man's essence. He can always say that these weak concepts of essence should be understood as synonyms for freedom or the ever changing "ensemble" of relationships and undertakings. However, Sartre probably pushes the envelope by claiming that man is "only what he will himself to be after this thrust toward existence". Strictly speaking this formulation disregards both the moment of nature and nurture and over-blows the moment of autonomous self-creation. In stressing the moment of self-creation one should be cautious not to equate it with the absolute and whimsical creation out of nothing. Man must be something in order to be able to exist and if so his projects define the direction. As the wording from the second part of the essay indicate, Sartre seems to be aware of several snares lurking behind some of his most radical formulations in the first part.

When Sartre says that man is "indefinable" because at first he is "nothing" he does not mean literally that man is "nothing" at all. If man is not just a creature and something definite he is not therefore a sheer nothing. Man is "nothing" in the sense that he is "nothing else but what he makes of himself". His biological nature, stripped of all individual characteristics and personal plans, is just an abstraction denoting man in general, i.e. nothing real and existent. Have you ever seen man in general? In addition, Sartre wants to say that man is "nothing" fixed and defined in time. At every point in time we have "something" as our being but man is a flow and development, self-overcoming.

Connotation:

Thesis (b)

After establishing this Sartre draws a very important although somewhat obscure distinction between what man "will have planned to be" (qu'il aura projete d'etre) and "what he will want to be" (qu'il vouloir voudra etre). He claims that man will be only the former but not the latter. In order to be able to get some grasp of this distinction it might be helpful to transpose it into another tense by comparing the following phrasings: "what man has planned to be" and "what man wanted to be". The second phrase corresponds to the common notion of "will" (vouloir) which designates a conscious wish or decision subsequent to what we have already made of ourselves. Sartre admits that "little" choices are always possible and that they in fact occur daily (day-to-day decisions): "I may want to belong to a political party, write a book, get married." But, for Sartre, these are only manifestations of an earlier, more spontaneous and more fundamental plan that is called "will" (volonte) in the strong sense. He claims that our small desires are only derivatives of these grounding choices that precede and guide our regular wishes and decisions - to be politically engaged, to become a man of letters, not to be a single, etc.

Note: The distinction between "what you planned" and "what you wanted" corresponds in some important aspects to the Socratic distinction between "what you want" and "what you see fit". The former is both fundamental and conducive to the best interest of the self, the latter is adaptable to circumstances and short-term calculations. Kant's distinction between willing something and wishing it may be applicable here: I can wish a lie, but I cannot will lying. One can think also of some parallels with Nietzsche's "will to power" or Freud's idea of "libidinal instincts and desires" which underlie our overt choices and actions. The major difference seems to be that the "fundamental plan" (or "will) in Sartre is not only (potentially) "self-aware" but also amenable to conscious self-inspection (?).