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Syllabi
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PHL
212
Instructor: Dr.
Bob Zunjic
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THOMAS HOBBES
Leviathan (1651)
Part
I, chs. xiii, xiv
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An Outline
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Thomas Hobbes wrote Leviathan
in the late 1640s. At the time he was living in exile (Paris)
which he chose voluntarily in order to avoid persecution. Not without reasons he feared that the forces of the Parliament could
put him on trial because of his royalist convictions. In fact undertook writing Leviathan to defend the monarchist idea. The book
was finished two years after the execution of Charles I and was
presented as a special gift to his successor Charles II who was
also exiled in Paris. Nonetheless the royalists of the time saw
it as an attempt to undermine the traditional view that the right
of the king is derived from divine law. They even suspected that Hobbes
was not a true monarchist. He was, but for his own reasons. The
supreme royal power is justified because only a sovereign
ruler can prevent a lapse into the state of war. This was not something that anti-royalists wanted to hear. Thus Hobbes was
suspected by both sides in the conflict. Almost as a confirmation
of royalist suspicions, he reconciled with the regime of the Commonwealth
after the publication of the book and returned to England.
Some scholars argue that the
Leviathan is the 'greatest work of political philosophy ever
written'. This may sound as an exaggeration but it certainly represents
the most powerful study of modern politics written in English.
By all means it is the most famous work of Thomas Hobbes, but no
less his most misunderstood work. Whatever the final jury on this
will be, it is undeniable that Leviathan, along with
The Prince of Machiavelli and the Utopia of Thomas
More, breaks up the classical union of ethics and politics that
had defined ancient political thought. Instead it
offers a political consideration of the means and conditions that
are necessary for the subsistence of a society in view of imminent
internal disintegration. Rather than deriving what is good
for man from his ultimate purpose of realizing the true human
potentials, Hobbes realistically draws conclusions about the necessary
measures for survival from that what human nature actually is:
selfish and aggressive, but rational. The paramount interest becomes
therefore safety, not happiness. The solution suggested - entering
into a kind of social contract - will become one of the most fruitful
venues of modern political philosophy.
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I OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND, AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY,
AND MISERY
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Premise 1:
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Human individuals are "by nature" equal
in their physical and mental abilities.
Note: Hobbes personifies
nature as a kind of living creator: "Nature hath made men so
equal...", but this wording is just a way of speaking. No matter
whether the word 'nature' stands for God's act of creation or for
some anonymous generative forces we have been created equal in decisive
respects.
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Qualification:
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Some differences exist indeed (one man could be
"manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another"). But
these differences are not considerable. And they do not give somebody
benefits which other people may not demand for themselves.
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Explanation:
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The differences are not sufficient to make anybody untouchable.
As Hegel has noted, in Hobbes view all men are equal in their vulnerability
and weakness.
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A Contrario
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The existing differences would be significant only if some people
could be excluded as a potential source of threat or fear due to
their inability to cause harm.
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Specification: |
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Body:
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The weakest individual has enough physical
strength to kill the strongest. If not directly then either "by
secret machination" (plotting) or by allying (conspiring) with
others.
Physical deficiencies could be compensated by means of joining forces
with other men or by using certain devices (technology) that give us edge over the stronger. |
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Mind:
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Mental faculties are even more equally distributed
among men. |
| Exceptions: |
To be sure, some individuals are more advanced
in the arts and sciences. For instance, people are not equally skilled
in the arts grounded upon words (literature, poetry, rhetoric, drama)
or in deductive sciences like mathematics (the skills of proceeding
upon infallible and general rules). |
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Irrelevancy:
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But, (1) very few possess these skills, and
(2) relatively small
areas are covered by them.
Furthermore, (3) these skills are not
innate faculties.
They must be sought intentionally and purposefully
by working hard to turn them into lasting (permanent) skills. |
| Relevancy: |
Equality is asserted for those skills that
are being acquired while looking for something else the way we acquire
experience. Whatever else we may do we acquire experience owing to the flow of time and just by
staying alive. And experience gives rise
to prudence that serves everyone to their satisfaction.
Note: Hobbes identifies
life experience with what the Ancients called prudence (practical
wisdom, whit, smartness). This means that prudence ceases to be the
exercise of the right reason in search of proportion and measure. Instead it turns into experientially
based awareness of what is harmful or beneficial to us. As has become
a conventional wisdom in Modernity, we know better than anybody else
what presents danger and what is good for us. |
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Inequality |
Equality |
| Physical Abilities |
Strength Size |
Vulnerability Ability to Harm |
| Mental Abilities |
Art Science |
Prudence Experience |
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| Implication: |
While it may seem that prudence is not equally
distributed among humans, it is being acquired according to the following
rules that apply equally to all:
For the same amount of time spent
we gain the same amount of experience.
Prudence consists in the
ability to draw practical conclusions from past experiences.
Note: This is a significant
departure from Aristotle who was convinced that prudence requires
both right reasoning and a corresponding character. Hobbes
conceives of prudence mostly as an awareness of what happened in the
past, an awareness that should avert us from doing something that
could put us in harms ways or cause punishment (iii, 7). The immediate
consequence of this conception is that everybody possesses prudence
and that nobody can judge on our own behalf whether we are satisfied
or not. Aristotle's idea that a philosopher (or a prudent man) can
question the feeling of contentment even against our own pronouncements
becomes presumptuous - another significant change brought about by
Modernity. |
| Objection: |
Some claim that they possess more wisdom
than others. |
| Explanation: |
This is a sheer conceitedness
that blinds many for the fundamental equality of human mind. The arrogance
of this kind should be accounted for by the direct access to our own
wisdom which leads people to believe that their whit is better than
the one of others. In other words, it is a prejudice stemming from
the natural familiarity with our own whit. |
| Rebuttal: |
Paradoxically, precisely this
claim of having more wisdom than others proves the equality. What is
decisive is the fact that "every man is contented with his share"
in common sense. People will acknowledge that many other individuals
are more witty, or more eloquent or more learned, but no one thinks
that their own mind is less good than anybody else's. To understand the
right implication of this statement one needs only to universalize the self-appreciation
people have of their whit to all other individuals. Which proves Hobbes'
point. |
| Equal
Distribution: |
Furthermore, since people do not want others to make judgments
on their behalf, being convinced that everyone knows for themselves
what is potentially harmful and what is not harmful for themselves,
it appears that the good sense is the best distributed ability in
the world.
Note: Compare Descartes' statement from A
Discourse on Method: "Good sense is of all things in the
world the most equally distributed, for everybody thinks himself
so abundantly provided with it that even those most difficult to
please in all other matters do not commonly desire more of it than
they already possess." This reasoning derives the equal value
of all individual minds from the universal individual identification
with your own mind which is mostly a psychological feeling.
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| Consequence
1: |
From the equality of abilities emerges
the equality of aspirations in the pursuit of ends. People believe
that they can equally hope to attain their goals as any other person.
Note: For Hobbes, the equality of rights
arises from the equality of abilities, not the other way round: equal
opportunities from the basic equality of rights. |
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| Premise
2: |
(Anthropological realism) Humans are
egoists who are relentlessly after their own goals. They aggressively
pursue their ends. |
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Saying: 'Man is a wolf to man.' (Homo
homini lupus est.) |
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| Premise
3: |
Human individuals desire the same goods, which they
cannot all enjoy as they are limited in number. Total gratification
of desires is not possible because of the chronic scarcity of
resources.
Limited resources (a very modern idea) coupled with our selfish
nature result in merciless competition. This generates a
universal concern (anxiety) for subsistence.
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| Assumptions |
1. Selfish Nature.
2. Aggressive Instincts.
3. Limited Resources. |
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| Consequence
2: |
This situation creates mutual enmity (animosity).
People view others as a threat or an obstacle in achieving their
goals. The result is constant diffidence (= mistrust). |
| Response: |
The ultimate stage in this development is
that people endeavor to destroy or subdue each other. |
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| Equality of Aspiration |
| Mutual Animosity |
| Aggression and Destruction |
| Expansion and Augmentation |
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Men attack others for the sake of one
of the three goals (or all of them):
(a) conservation (self-preservation),
(b) expansion (conquest),
(c) delectation (joy of conflict). |
| Strategies: |
What to do to safeguard one's possessions
and secure safety? It seems that acting from anticipation and
increasing the readiness are the most reasonable strategies.
Therefore it should be allowed to everyone to act preemptively (from anticipation of threats) and to constantly increase power (arms-race) as both are the ways to secure conservation.
However, Hobbes analyses all these strategies and shows that
none of them is satisfactory. |
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(1) Individual strength (single power) is not a sufficient protection against others. There will be always
some aggressive individuals who will want to invade and conquer. And
some will be successful although only temporarily. Everyone can expect
others to come to dispossess them of their belongings and even to deprive
them of their life.
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(2) A comprehensive subjugation of others
("master the persons of all men") is what first comes to
mind. But it is physically impossible to carry out this strategy.
A total indiscriminate action against all other people would eventually
exhaust the agent no matter how strong he is (stretched too thin).
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(3) It seems that a reasonable
anticipation of possible threats that should be addressed is a
better strategy. Attack only those that are imminent or potential threat. But anticipation and intelligence can never be perfect.
No one can predict all potential challenges. |
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(4) Defensive strategy does not
work either. Just standing in defense (as moderates would probably
be inclined to do) and taking care of conservation leads to a certain
downfall. However, constantly increasing power drains energy and
resources in that never-ending race. |
| Consequence
3: |
Given (1) and (2) people will have to constantly
increase their power just for the sake of subsistence. Nobody can
assure the conservation without progressive acquisition of power.
Note: There is a strong logic here. Power is
powerful only if it expands and grows. "When you slow down you
fall behind." Stagnation is decline. |
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| Conservation of Power |
Legitimate |
| Augmentation of Power |
Necessary |
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| Conclusion
1: |
Hence the augmentation of power (dominion
over man) is a necessity and should be also allowed. |
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In order to survive one has to be overambitious. This strategy is a necessity although it leads to a continuous fight. |
| Consequence
4: |
Absolute security can never
be attained. There is no end in the endeavor to subdue others
and no man can eliminate all threats and dangers preemptively. Thus
even though acting for the sake of conservation is "generally
allowed", it is not a goal that ever could be fully accomplished.
Moreover it does not guarantee safety. |
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Some (dominators) will always pursue
their actions further than their security requires. |
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(1) Some will enjoy the excess of their
own power in the acts that go beyond their own security. |
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(2) Some will seek conquest for the sake
of pure fame or recognition. |
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| Strength |
Weakness |
| Individual Power |
Insufficient |
| Comprehensive Subjugation |
Not feasible |
| Anticipation of Threat |
Never Complete |
| Defensive Posture |
Decline |
| Increasing Power |
Arms-race |
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Causes of Conflict |
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| Premise
4: |
"Men have no pleasure... ...in keeping
company where there is no power able to over-awe them all." Society is not a product of natural tendency to gather and live socially. Social life is against nature. The
suggestion is that we need something more potent and efficient than
individual strength to keep us in check and ultimately protect ourselves.
Note: Hobbes thinks that
man takes much more pleasure in conquest than in communal life. This
is obviously directed against Aristotelian dictum that man is a "social
animal". Early modern political philosophy tended to view people
as by nature so unsocial that they would constantly clash if there
were no power to keep them in check. |
| Question: |
Why is it difficult to be social without
external coercion? |
| Answer: |
We expect others to accept our own self-appraisal
and if this does not happen we tend to impose it by harming those
who give us less than we want. |
| Conflict: |
There are three main causes for quarrels
in human nature (cf. Thucyd., I, 25): Competition, Distrust and quest for Recognition. |
| Causes
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Means
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Objectives
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Downsides |
| Competition |
Power (offensive)
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Gains (profit)
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Permanent Risk
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| Diffidence |
Power (defensive)
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Safety (respite)
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Temporary Relief
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| Glory* |
Violence (erratic)
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Recognition (honor)
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Elusive State
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Different means are used in these conflicts, but they are all at one in failing to be entirely effective.
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*Much before Hegel, Hobbes had realized how strong motive recognition could be. He has even included a moment of delectation (pleasure) in the longing for recognition. However, as Rousseau has noted long ago, seeking recognition, reputation and honor is a strong social motive that does not feet into Hobbes' anti-social picture of human nature and the state of nature. |
| Vainglory |
Hobbes deplores the foolishness of glory seeking individuals who do not value life enough. Rash people are dangerous both for others and themselves. Fear is a better companion because it creates a necessary mood to recognize a common power that would keep all in quiet. |
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| Conclusion
2: |
If men are left without any common power (a constant refrain) the result will be a permanent and universal war of every man
against every man (bellum omnium contra omnes).
Note: War "of all against all" does not necessarily
mean of "every person against every person all of the time". |
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| Clarification: |
War does not consists only in battles and
actual use of force, "but in a tract of time, wherein the will to
contend by battle is sufficiently known". |
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In this respect Hobbes makes a parallel between
the notion of foul weather and the notion of war time. |
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| The nature of foul weather |
The nature of war time |
| Inclination to shower + actual showers |
Disposition to fighting + actual fighting |
| Notion:
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In other words, the proper notion of war
is much broader than its common (superficial) version suggests. It
includes time, that is to say preparations, the build up of forces, war mongering, actual
or implicit threats as well as actual battles.
Note: This concept of
war is more comprehensive and illuminating than any legal definition
of it (cf. for the latter H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis,
I, i, 20). |
| Disposition: |
What does the wording "the
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known" point to? To
a disposition to fight. A disposition is real as threat. Threat is
not only a factor, but very often it is a stronger component in a
stand off than the use of force itself. The longer it lasts the more
difficult it is to (with)stand it. Sometimes the consumption of threat
by accepting fighting brings relief from the unbearable tension. |
| Peace: |
We can talk about peace only if in a tract
of time there is no threat and consequently no disposition to war.
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| Time:
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"Therefore the notion of time is to
be considered in the nature of war." (The same holds true of peace.)
But if the existing conditions do not provide any security beyond
our personal strength, then we should not delude ourselves that we live in
peace. |
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Whenever men live relying only on their individual strength they are in the condition of war. |
| Equasion: |
The time of war = the time when we rely solely on individual strength. |
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| General
Conclusion: |
The conditions of the "state of nature"
are exactly those of a permanent and universal war. The negative consequences
are both individual and collective: |
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Individual:
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(a) Men are doomed to live in "continual
fear and danger of violent death".
(b) The life of man becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short".
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Collective:
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(a) The balance of power based only on readiness
of all to fight does not bring security.
(b) Without security, no production, no trade, no culture, no society.
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Specifics:
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"No culture of the earth" - no husbandry (agriculture).
(Peasants pay the highest price in every war.)
"No instruments of moving and removing" - no large scale
transportation.
"No knowledge of the face of the earth" - no natural sciences.
"No account of time" - no history.
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State of Nature |
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| Absent |
Present |
Result |
| Industry |
Idleness |
Poverty |
| Husbandry |
Neglect |
Famine |
| Navigation |
Immobility |
Futility |
| Construction |
Destruction |
Danger |
| Transportation |
Confinement |
Nastiness |
| Science |
Ignorance |
Fear of death |
| History |
Oblivion |
Short life |
| Art |
Boorishness |
Brutish life |
| Society |
Hostility |
Solitary life |
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| Objection
1: |
How can nature thus dissociate men? Is this a plausible account? Is human nature really so aggressive? Human nature is not
made up only of desires and passions. Where is the empirical evidence
for that "inference" about aggressiveness, competitiveness and
mistrust derived from a grim concept of man? |
| Refutation: |
You want some evidence from experience.
Well, answer these questions:
(1) Why do you arm yourself when traveling? Obviously, you do not trust your
fellow subjects.
(2) Why do you lock your doors? Obviously, you do not trust your neighbors.
(3) Why do you lock your chests in your own house? Obviously, you do not trust
your own family members. |
| Human
Nature: |
These actions are very telling about human
nature precisely because they are being taken while there are laws
and the police force to protect people. What would happen without
them is easy to guess. This is not an accusation of human nature.
Human desires and passions are not sinful in themselves. Nor are the
actions that proceed from them.
Note: Notice that Hobbes does not speak about natural wickedness
or the original sin of man. He simply states how human nature manifests itself. |
| Precondition: |
Human actions could be wrong or immoral
only if there is a law that forbids them, but in the state of nature
there are no laws.
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| Sovereign: |
These laws could be passed only when people
agree upon the person who will make them.
Note: This sounds as a clear endorsement of monarchism. Later on, however, Hobbes indicates that the sovereign power is not necessarily vested in one person. What matters is that there is a common power that can keep people in check. |
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| Objection
2: |
There has never been such a time nor a condition
of permanent war (the state of nature). |
| Clarification: |
Although Hobbes speaks about "the time when
men lived without common power" he does not make a historical thesis
about certain period of the past. He concedes that such a state has
never existed "generally so" and "over all the world".
If God is the true ruler of the world then we can not say that there
was lawlessness even in the moment when Cain killed Abel. Therefore
the concept of the state of nature should not be taken literally.
But it is not an outlandish construct either. |
| Evidence: |
The empirical basis for the thesis about
the war in the state of nature is threefold:
(a) There have been always spots of endemic wars (lawlessness) where
conditions of instability and insecurity come close to those of the
state of nature.
Note: Hobbes mentions
"the savage people in many places of America" who do not
have any government (except on the level of families). However, despite
constant clashes and local warlords the tribes of native Americans
had a kind of internal and external code which surpassed the bonds
based on "natural lust". This is certainly not the best example but Hobbes could give ample empirical evidence even today ranging from Somalia and Columbia to Afghanistan and Sudan. |
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(b) Civil wars are recreations on a large scale of that situation into which any civil society will lapse if government breaks down.
Note: Hobbes had in mind the historical examples of anarchy and disasters resulting from the civil wars in Ancient Greece, but modern cases like Lebanon or Bosnia are also pertinent here. |
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(c) The posture of war is a permanent condition. Throughout human history we see mistrust,
tensions, muscle-flexing, spying and everything else that belongs
to "cold war". And "in all times" there
are continual confrontations between individuals, groups and countries.
Note: If we are in a continual
war why we are not miserable as we should be? This hostile posture
against the external enemy does not always evolve into the war of
"all against all" ("one against another") internally.
The reason for this is that confrontation with external enemy mobilizes
individual subjects and engages their energy in a way which prevents
a direct fall into previously described misery. |
| Three Kinds of War |
| (a) Endemic War |
| (b) Civil War |
| (c) Cold War |
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| Point:
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By means of a thought experiment with the
state of nature Hobbes demonstrates not what was the case in the past
but what would happen without the laws of politics and morality. |
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| Consequence
1: |
In the state of nature there are no objective moral distinctions. The notions of justice and injustice do not
have there any meaning. The only virtues are force and fraud. |
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Justice requires a relationship with others
in a society. It is not a quality of the body or of mind (we all possess
these in the state of nature). But an isolated man cannot be just
either in his thoughts or actions. Conversely, "where no law, no injustice".
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| Explanation: |
The distinction between right and wrong coincides with my appetites. In the state of nature the only principles
of action are will and desire. Where there is no common power to keep everyone in awe,
my will is the only law. The problem is that others will regard their
will in the same way, which means that every man will regard everything
as theirs. |
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| Consequence
2: |
Without a common power there is no propriety
and property (mine or thine), for in the state of war everything belongs
to anyone who can take it and for so long as they can keep it. Even our body stands out for grabs. |
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| Absent |
Present |
| Justice |
Force |
| Law |
Lawlessness |
| Morality |
Fraud |
| Propriety |
Dispossession |
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| Insight: |
This is a dangerous situation. Is there
any alternative to the state of war? We are egoists but we are not
fools. |
| Exit: |
Passions and reason together point to the
way out of the state of nature. |
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| Solution: |
Make a reciprocal social contract with other
opposing individuals and establish a common power "to keep them in
awe" (the State = Leviathan). In return for renouncing some
aspirations enjoy security and peace. |
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| Motives: |
Passions that incline men to peace are:
- fear of death (better live in disgrace than die in honor)
- desire to obtain things necessary to commodious living
- hope to get them by using only industry
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| Means: |
Reason suggests convenient articles of peace
upon which people can agree. These articles are what Hobbes calls the "Laws of Nature". The laws of nature are therefore the dictates of egoistic but enlightened prudence.
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| General
Conclusion: |
Morality arises only after the acceptance of these laws. It is nothing else but obedience to the laws of nature. Thus morality is a form of social
compromise between egoists. It reduces certain rights but brings peace
and justice.
The benefit of morality does not lie that much in positive effects
it brings about as in the calamities it helps to avoid. |
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State
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Condition
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Rights
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Justice
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| State of Nature |
War |
Unlimited |
Non-Existent |
| State of Society |
Peace |
Limited |
Ruling |
Moral philosophy is the study of the Laws of Nature. There are 19 laws in number but three are fundamental.
II OF THE FIRST AND SECOND
NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS
| Distinction:
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Hobbes admonishes not to confuse
right (ius) and law (lex), that is to say, the right
of nature and the law of nature. He speaks about the right of nature
(jus naturale) with regard to the state of nature, and consequently
defines this right as unlimited liberty to pursue one's own interests.
Conversely, the law of nature (ius naturale) determines human
conduct in the wake and after the opposing individuals have agreed
to grant away some rights. It binds to something. |
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Right = liberty to do or forbear something;
Law = obligation to do or avoid something. |
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Note: This distinction cuts through the more general concept of the right of nature as formulated by Hugo Grotius: "A dictate of right reason indicating that some act is either morally necessary or morally shameful, because of its agreement or disagreement with man's nature as rational and social being." For Hobbes, it is the function of the law to sanction such congruence or deviation. Good is what is in accord with the laws, bad is what is contrary to them - private appetites loose ground as the standard of what is right. |
| Definition: |
For Hobbes, liberty is conceived
as "the absence of external impediments" which means that those
obstacles that exist are not sufficient to prevent the subject of
doing what s/he wants. |
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As long as there are no laws to impose any constraint we have liberty to do whatever we want, but once they are in power they constrain our conduct. |
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| Right |
Law |
| Ius |
Lex |
| Liberty |
Obligation |
| Absence of Impediments |
Presence of Constraints |
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| State of Nature |
Rights of Nature |
Unlimited Freedom |
| State of Contract |
Laws of Nature |
Limited Freedom |
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A. The Right of Nature:
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= the liberty every man has to use his own power
for the preservation of his own life or of doing anything related
to it.
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| Problem:
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If we go only by the right of nature, there
are no limits in our actions: "There is nothing to which every man
had not right by nature." On the contrary, "every man has a right
to everything; even to one another's body." However, if only natural
right exists (even though a one nobody can fully realize), there is
no security. |
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| Right |
State of Nature |
| Unlimited Aspirations |
No Security |
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Solution:
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A general rule of reason requires to restrict this very general
right: "lay down the right to all things". In that sense the law
implies obligation for individuals. It imposes external coercion,
but it is in the best interest of all.
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| B.
The Laws of Nature |
= the precepts found out by reason that forbid
men to do what is destructive of their life. |
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| Status: |
These precepts make up the minimal morality
necessary for safe and good life. The fact that people observe these rules creates impression that they are like physical laws (human nature has predictable inclinations). They should be obeyed even if there
is no sovereign to enforce them. Assuming, of course, that one wants to live out
"the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live"
(this formulation sounds very autobiographical). |
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The following are the most important rules of conduct for rational egoists. |
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| 1st
Law of Nature: |
| Endeavor
peace as long as there is hope of obtaining it. |
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| Condition: |
If the peace is not feasible everyone has
right to revert to A ("the sum of the right of nature"):
use all means to defend yourself. |
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2nd Law of Nature:
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Lay
down your right to all things and restrict your our own liberty
against others.
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| Condition: |
Hobbes implicitly suggests that this laws makes sense under the same condition as the first one - that the other party is willing to lay down their right. Otherwise everyone has right to revert to the right of nature. |
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To lay down right to anything is to divest
yourself of certain liberty. In this case this would be the liberty
to hinder another man of the benefit of his own right. If you refrain
from hindering the other man this will lead to the diminution of impediments
for him to use his own original right. |
| Measure: |
We
are expected to renounce some rights for the sake of peace and agreement,
but this should not be an arbitrary act. The question is to which
extent should we lay down our rights. The measure of renouncement is determined by
the liberty we allow against ourselves. In this way, the benefits
we allow others should befall in turn on us. |
| Reciprocity:
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Hobbes says that this law is in fact the
"Law of the Gospel". The reference is to the Golden Rule as formulated
by Jesus of Nazareth (Matth. 7: 12; Luke, 6: 31).
Although the overall tenor of Jesus' morality is rather charitable than reciprocal the fact is that this rule occurs in the Gospels as the remnant of the Old Testament morality (cf. The Rule of Reciprocity). It is noteworthy that the rule is formulated positively.
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| Positive Formulation:
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"Whatsoever you require that other should
do to you, that do ye to them." |
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Given the spirit of the second Law of nature a negative formulation would better fit the requirement for self-restraint in the exercise of natural rights. |
| Negative Formulation: |
"What you do not want done to you, do not
do to others" (quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris).
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| Repercussions:
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By laying down certain rights we do not give
to anyone a right which he had not before. We only allow the other
to enjoy his original rights "without hindrance" from us; we cannot
guarantee that others will not hinder, but the effect of the mutual agreement will
be that we also diminish the impediments to use our own right.
Note: A literal compliance with the rule is not always possible or admissible,
but it is good as a guard against overblown self-interest even though
it is less than what the principle of meekness suggests. |
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Two
Ways of Laying Down a Right: |
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(a) Simply renouncing a right without caring who will benefit.
(b) Transferring a right while intending to benefit somebody.
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| Obligation: |
By doing (a) or (b) man binds himself not
to hinder the beneficiaries of the renouncement (duty). On
the contrary, he implies that such a hindrance would be injury
or injustice. |
| Parallel: |
Injury and injustice correspond in legal
controversies to absurdities and contradictions in academic disputations.
This is because by renouncing some right I bound myself not to hinder
those to whom such right is granted. Any violation of this would be
tantamount to a contradiction in logic or sacrilege in religion.
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Law
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Logic
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Religion
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| Injury |
Contradiction |
Sacrilege |
| Injustice |
Absurdity |
Blasphemy |
Note: Thus injustice in terms of the secular
law corresponds to the absurdity or blasphemy in the language of disputations
(see the illustration of this point in the two parallel columns on
the frontice-piece). |
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Two
Methods of Laying Down Right: |
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(a) By means of a declaration.
(b) By means of a signification.
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| Signs: |
In both cases one uses some signs (either
words or actions or both) by which men are bound or obliged = bonds.
Their strength does not stem from the written words or signs but from
fear of negative consequences.
Signs could be either express (explicit, not implied) or by
inference. |
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Two
Goals of Laying Down Right: |
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(a) For the sake of some reciprocal right.
(b) For some other good (instrumentally).
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| Motive: |
As transferring a right must be a voluntary
act of every man, its object(ive) must be some good. Ultimately it
is the security of a "a man's person, in his life". |
|
Limitation:
|
Since the ultimate goal of renouncing some rights is "the security
of man's person" it is inconceivable that somebody can voluntarily
give up the right to self-defense. Or that someone voluntarily accepts
wounds, chains and imprisonment. There is no benefit in accepting
imprisonment. If someone accepts to be injured that person could
never be certain how far the injury would go.
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| Exclusion: |
If a man, by words or signs, despoils himself
of security and other related goods, we must assume that he misunderstands
these words and signs by means of which he renounces his right. Hence the signs contrary
to the subjective interest are null and void. |
| Difference: |
Transferring could be a transfer of the right
to a thing or both a transfer to a thing and of the right to a thing.
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Definitions: |
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Contract
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is the mutual transferring of right or things;
this could be simultaneous or consecutive. Contract exists among all subjects in transition to the state of law. |
| Gift (Grace) |
is a non-mutual transferring of right and
could be made for various reasons (gains, reputation, relief). |
| Pact or Covenant |
is a contract in which one party performs
first and relies on the other to fulfill his obligation later; the
very existence of a covenant indicates that certain rights have been
renounced or transferred.
This agreement is made between the subjects and the sovereign. |
| Promise (Faith) |
is a contract in which one or both parties
perform their obligations later. |
| Bonds |
are statements or actions by which men are
bound. |
| Foundation: |
Hobbes grounds the state of natural laws on a social covenant (rather than contract) but he uses the latter word as a generic expression. |
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Conditions:
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Covenant could be either "express" (I give,
I grant, I have granted, I will give) or "by inference".
There are no valid covenants and moral standards until the coercive power has been established. Words and integrity do not mean much to Hobbes.
A covenant is valid
only in a "civil state" where there is a common power to enforce
it. In the state of nature it is void upon any suspicion.
Otherwise, when there is a common power, it is not void. It is not
void if the reasons for not performing it (out of fear) predate its
emergence. What could not hinder a man from promising should not be
accepted as an excuse for not performing what has been agreed upon.
A change of heart or mind is not a sufficient reason for annulment.
However, a man cannot be expected to lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds or imprisonment. The idea of a covenant is to establish protection and safety; therefore any obligation to surrender the right for self-preservation and protection would contradict it.
Note: Nonetheless Hobbes thinks that a prisoner
of war who was released for ransom has obligation to keep the promise even though there is no coercive power to enforce the obligation.
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| 3rd
Law of Nature: |
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| Grounds:
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Without this law covenants are in vain and the condition of war
is present.
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| Fountain: |
This is the origin of all justice: not to
give everyone a "fair share" or "their own" but to stick to what was
renounced "at the beginning".
Note: Hobbes implies that
his definition of justice is more fundamental than the one accepted
in the Schools (Platonic) as it states the precondition for having
anything as your "own". |
| Failure: |
Injustice is a failure to perform the covenant
made (assuming there is no justified fear not to perform). |
| Coercion: |
There must be some coercive power to compel
men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of
some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach
of their covenant. Fear of punishment keeps promise. |
| Commonwealth: |
A common power could be established only
if there is a commonwealth. There is no justice and propriety without
commonwealth (see the symbols below). In fact, the (traditional) justice
in the sense of "giving to every man his own" is derived
from the fundamental notion in the sense of performing the covenant.
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| Leviathan |
The multitude is united in one mega-person (see the frontispiece). He possesses the undivided power and no
one has liberty to disobey without consequences. That power is the monster Leviathan who "beholds everything that is high; he is the king over all the sons of pride" (Job 41). Only out of fear from this monster men would be ready to curb their aggressiveness. But they will be compensated for that. |
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The sovereign power is not itself a party to the covenant despite the fact that his sovereignty stems from the covenant. Hence a sovereign cannot breach the covenant. |
| Morality: |
The sovereign determines what is good and what is bad. Morality exists only on the basis of a social
covenant. The above three principles (Laws) define the so called "minimal morality" which is the basis for more elaborate moral codes. Their source is ultimately fear, their purpose security (safety). |
Morality of the
Social Contract
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Nature
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Source
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Purpose
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Contract
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Fear
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Security
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"Man
is a wolf to man. I am here to protect everyone against everyone."
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LEVIATHAN
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KING
Secular power
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The Symbols
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ARCHBISHOP
Ecclesiastic power
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Fort
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Church
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Crown
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Mitra
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Cannon
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Excommunication Lightning
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Military Insignia
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Weapons of Logic
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Battle
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Disputation
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