Abstract
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Market Power in the Electric
Power Industry
Joseph Diamond and Jon D. Edwards
Institute for the Study of International Aspects of Competition
Working Paper 97-2
Market power is a subject of concern in a restructured electric power industry. In 1995, the U.S. electric power industry saw high rates of announced mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The objective of this paper is to investigate the interactions and effects of M&A and market power, both within California and throughout the U.S., and make recommendations concerning the FERC's NOI on merger criteria and policy. M&A can be a result of economic efficiency, defensive motives, diversification, growth and personal aggrandizement, market power, and deregulation and international competition. M&A often do not work due to poor analysis or faulty implementation.
A survey of views on M&A in the electric power industry was done. Perspectives ranged from viewing recent M&A as strategic, designed to hold off competitive threats, leading to efficiency, and moving toward disaggregation as a natural part of the industry restructuring, and the development of "workable competition". Specific recommendations relevant to the FERC NOI include:
It is too early to tell whether M&A in the electric power industry will lead to efficient restructuring to obtain economies of scale and/or scope, or will pose a threat to "workable competition" through the exercise of market power. FERC should note and evaluate the following point when revising its merger policy: Deregulation should be supplemented by strict antitrust policy in order to avoid market power abuses that are not in the public interest.
Appendix I provides a brief overview of the filings to FERC on its NOI. Appendix II is a summary of the new FERC policy stemming from its NOI Docket No. RM96-6-000 regarding mergers. We close with Appendix III which are comments on FERC's new merger policy.